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Knowledge, Risk, and Wrongdoing: The Model
Penal Code’s Forgotten Answer to the Riddle
of Objective Probability
ERIC A. JOHNSON†
In criminal cases, courts routinely say that the
lawfulness of an actor‘s conduct depends in part on the
objective probability of harm associated with the conduct.
The conventional wisdom among criminal law theorists,
meanwhile, is that objective probabilities of the required
sort do not even exist, much less determine the lawfulness
of conduct. This Article sides with the courts. Drawing on a
forgotten but central feature of the Model Penal Code, and
on a parallel feature of the law of search and seizure, the
Article argues that the answer to the riddle of objective
probability lies in the difference between what the actor
knows and what the actor merely believes. It argues that
probabilities calculated on the basis of what the actor
knows—on the basis of ―the circumstances known to him,‖
in the Model Penal Code‘s formulation—are not illusory,
and moreover are objective in exactly the way that the
criminal law appears to require. It argues, further, that the
circumstances known to the actor encompass or imply
everything essential to the actor‘s perspective, and so
provide a fair basis for determining the justifiability and
lawfulness—if not the culpability—of the actor‘s conduct.
INTRODUCTION
Criminal liability for offenses like implied-malice
murder, reckless manslaughter, and negligent homicide
often depends in part on how probable the proscribed
† Professor, University of Illinois College of Law. For their comments on earlier
drafts, I am grateful to Margareth Etienne, Ernest Johnson, Andrew Leipold,
and Peter Westen; to participants in faculty workshops at the University of
Illinois College of Law, Northwestern University Law School, and Washington
University School of Law; and to participants in the New Voices in Legal Theory
Conference at St. Louis University School of Law.
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outcome was.1 Consider, for example, the case of Marjorie
Knoller, who was convicted of implied-malice murder after
her two Presa Canario dogs mauled a neighbor to death.2
Knoller‘s liability for implied-malice murder hinged in part,
the court said, on whether her conduct in keeping the dogs
posed a ―high probability of causing death.‖3 And consider
the case of Sharan Ann Williams, who was convicted of
―injury to a child‖ after her two children died in a house fire
while her boyfriend was babysitting them.4 The jury
concluded that Williams had been reckless in leaving her
children with the boyfriend, whose home was without
utilities and who often used candles for light.5 Williams‘s
liability, like Knoller‘s, hinged in part on ―the probability of
the anticipated injury.‖6
What courts mean by ―probability‖ in cases like these is
actual, or objective, probability. In Knoller‘s case, for
example, the California Supreme Court said that the
required ―high probability of causing death‖ is the ―objective
component‖ of implied-malice murder.7 And in Williams‘s

1. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 4.3, at 259-60
(1978) (identifying the ―likelihood of causing death under the circumstances‖ as
a critical factor in addressing ―the acceptability and culpability of risk-taking‖);
GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART § 26, at 62 (2d ed. 1961)
(identifying ―the degree of probability of the consequence‖ as a critical factor in
liability for unintentional crimes); Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A
Rationale of the Law of Homicide: I, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 701, 744 (1937) (―[T]he
desirability of preventing a particular act because it may result in death, turns
upon . . . the probability that death or serious injury will result.‖).
2. People v. Knoller, 158 P.3d 731, 732 (Cal. 2007).
3. Id. at 742.
4. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750, 765-66 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)
(reversing jury‘s verdict and remanding for entry of a judgment of acquittal).
5. Id. at 749.
6. Id. at 752 n.24 (quoting Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 22
(Tex. 1994) (―Extreme risk is a function of both the magnitude and the
probability of the anticipated injury‖ (quoting Transp. Ins. Co., 879 S.W.2d at
22)).
7. Knoller, 158 P.3d at 742; see also, e.g., Jeffries v. State, 169 P.3d 913, 917
(Alaska 2007) (―[Implied-malice] murder is [reserved] for cases in which the
objective risk of death or serious physical injury posed by the defendant‘s
actions is ‗very high.‘‖); Alan C. Michaels, Note, Defining Unintended Murder,
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case, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals said that the
―probability and magnitude of the potential harm‖ to others
—the component parts of risk, in other words8—are
measured ―objectively.‖9 To be sure, this requirement of
objective risk does not exhaust the content of manslaughter
or implied-malice murder, or even criminally negligent
homicide. All of these offenses have a culpability component
that is distinct from the objective component.10
Nevertheless, the measurement of the actual or objective
probability of harm—and, derivatively, of the actual or
objective risk—usually is a critical part of the factfinder‘s
work in these cases.
85 COLUM. L. REV. 786, 791 nn.27 & 29 (1985) (identifying states where the
courts look to ―the actual degree of risk‖ in defining implied-malice murder).
8. See Sarah Green, The Risk Pricing Principle: A Pragmatic Approach to
Causation and Apportionment of Damages, 4 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 159, 161
(2005) (―[R]isk has been . . . defined as the probability of harm occurring
multiplied by the magnitude of the harm that might eventually occur.‖).
9. Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 763; see also, e.g., State v. Kistenmacher, 436
N.W.2d 168, 171 (Neb. 1989) (holding that factfinder‘s assessment of risk in
manslaughter prosecution is ―purely objective‖); State v. Ebinger, 603 A.2d 924,
925 (N.H. 1992) (―Whether the defendant failed to become aware of a
‗substantial and unjustifiable risk‘ is determined by an objective test, not by
reference to the defendant‘s subjective perception.‖); State v. Robinson, 63 P.3d
105, 108 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (holding in prosecution for manslaughter that
―the magnitude of the risk itself . . . is an objective matter‖); State v. Brooks, 658
A.2d 22, 26-27 (Vt. 1995) (holding that involuntary manslaughter statute
requires ―the jury to objectively assess the risk‖).
10. See Knoller, 158 P.3d at 742 (citing People v. Thomas, 261 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal.
1953)) (explaining that in addition to objective risk, implied-malice murder
requires that the defendant act without regard to human life); Williams, 235
S.W.3d at 752 n.24 (―Subjectively, the defendant must have actual awareness of
the extreme risk created by his or her conduct.‖ (quoting Transp. Ins. Co., 879
S.W.2d at 22)); see also George P. Fletcher, The Theory of Criminal Negligence:
A Comparative Analysis, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 401, 429 (1971) (arguing that even
criminal negligence has two dimensions: legality and culpability); Eric A.
Johnson, Mens Rea for Sexual Abuse: The Case for Defining the Acceptable Risk,
99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 42-43 (2009) (explaining culpability component
of recklessness and criminal negligence and its relationship to the assessment of
the risk); Paul H. Robinson, Prohibited Risks and Culpable Disregard or
Inattentiveness: Challenge and Confusion in the Formulation of Risk-Creation
Offenses, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 367, 367-69 (2003) (arguing that
recklessness and negligence pose two distinct questions: [W]hether ―the actor
create[d] a risk the law prohibits‖ and whether the actor was sufficiently
culpable to ―deserve the condemnation of a criminal conviction‖).
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Or so the courts say. Criminal law theorists, on the
other hand, have raised serious questions about whether
the idea of objective probability, as invoked in the criminal
cases, is even coherent.11 The theorists‘ concerns about
objective probability are basically two. The first is that
courts cannot mean by ―objective probability‖ what they
seem to: namely, a probability calculated on the basis of all
the objective facts as they existed at the moment of the
defendant‘s criminal act.12 If the finder of fact were to take
into account all the objective facts—―all the forces by which
nature [was] animated and the respective situation of the
beings who compose[d] it‖13—she always would arrive at a
probability of either 1 or 0, depending on whether the harm
actually had occurred or not.14 The world is deterministic at
the macroscopic level, after all.15 Thus, in cases where the
11. See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER ET AL., CRIME AND CULPABILITY 29-31 (2009)
(arguing that objective probabilities are ―illusory,‖ since, from an objective
perspective, all events have a probability of either one or zero—leaving aside
quantum events); Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, Negligence in the Air, 3
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 333, 358 (2002) (―Indeterministic microphysics to the
side, there is no such thing as an objective risk; there are only risks to be
perceived from certain epistemic vantage points.‖); Kenneth W. Simons,
Deontology, Negligence, Tort, and Crime, 76 B.U. L. REV. 273, 290-91 (1996)
(―[I]n the objective sense, a person creates a ‗risk‘ of harm of either zero or
one.‖); Peter Westen, Impossibility Attempts: A Speculative Thesis, 5 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 523, 547 (2008) (―[I]t is incoherent to speak of actual past risks and
threats regarding harms that we know ex post did not occur if we mean to be
referring to the knowledge that we possess ex post.‖).
12. Courts sometimes insist that this is exactly what they mean by objective
probability. See, e.g., People v. Maciel, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 628, 634 (Ct. App. 2003)
(holding that relevant probabilities are calculated on the basis of ―all the
surrounding circumstances‖).
13. PIERRE SIMON & MARQUIS DE LAPLACE, A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY ON
PROBABILITIES 4 (Frederick Wilson Truscott & Frederick Lincoln Emory, trans.,
Dover Publications, 1951) (1814).
14. David D. Friedman, Impossibility, Subjective Probability, and
Punishment for Attempts, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 179, 183 (1991); Heidi M. Hurd, The
Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249, 263 n.35 (1996); Alan C.
Michaels, Acceptance: The Missing Mental State, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 953, 972 n.65
(1998); Kenneth W. Simons, Dimensions of Negligence in Criminal and Tort
Law, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 283, 300 n.39 (2002); Westen, supra note 11,
at 544.
15. Hurd & Moore, supra note 11, at 358; see also BRIAN GREENE, THE
ELEGANT UNIVERSE 93, 116 (2003) (explaining why the smallness of Planck‘s
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proscribed harm actually had occurred, the finder of fact
would have to infer that it was bound to occur—that the
probability of harm was 1. So too, in cases where the harm
had not occurred, the finder of fact would have to infer that
the harm was bound not to occur. ―To the omniscient
observer,‖ as Paul Robinson has said, ―there is no such
thing as a risk, even ex ante.‖16
The only apparent alternative is to measure the
probability of harm from the perspective of a less-thanomniscient ―reasonable person,‖ who is hypothetically
invested with knowledge of some but not all of the relevant
facts.17 This reasonable-person-centered alternative is the
object of the criminal law theorists‘ second concern. The
law, they argue, often makes use of the reasonable-person
construct to help factfinders decide what kinds of conduct
and thinking are appropriate to an underlying set of facts or
beliefs.18 But a reasonable-person-centered theory of
probability, in contrast, would rely on the reasonable person
in generating the underlying facts and beliefs themselves,

constant has the effect of confining most quantum indeterminacy ―to the
microscopic realm‖).
16. Robinson, supra note 10, at 386.
17. ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 11, at 29 (―[T]he ‗objective‘ approach . . .
requires that we construct an artificial perspective containing some but not all
information.‖); see also R.A. DUFF, CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS 82, 195 (1996) (arguing
that the only alternative to the subjective approach to risk is a reasonableperson approach, in which liability would ―depend on what a reasonable person
would have believed or expected, not on what the defendant (unreasonably)
believed or expected‖); Kenneth W. Simons, Retributivism Refined—or Run
Amok?, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 551, 573 n.35 (2010) (book review) (arguing that the
logical alternative to objective risk is ―the risk as perceived by a reasonable
person in the shoes of the actor‖); FLETCHER, supra note 1, §3.3.3, at 150
(assuming that the objective risk associated with a particular criminal attempt
is measured from the perspective of ―an objective observer‖).
18. See Westen, supra note 11, at 545-46 (―[The reasonable-person standard]
is a normative measure of what kinds of conduct, thinking, and emotions are
normatively appropriate to such facts as obtain or are believed to obtain.‖); see
also Peter Westen, Individualizing the Reasonable Person in Criminal Law, 2
CRIM. L. & PHIL. 137, 138 (2008) (―[R]easonableness] is a normative measure of
ways in which it is right for persons to think, feel or behave – or, at the very
least, ways in which it is not wrong for them to do so.‖).
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from the ground up.19 In this role, as Larry Alexander has
said, the reasonable-person construct is ―indeterminate
through and through.‖20 There is no non-arbitrary way of
deciding what a reasonable person knows about, say, the
dangers posed by Presa Canario dogs.
The implications of this twofold critique are potentially
profound. If, indeed, the idea of objective probability is
incoherent, then the criminal law requires modification in
one of three ways. The first alternative would be to
construct a non-probabilistic account of risk, as Peter
Westen has done.21 The second would be to construct an
account of objective wrongdoing that does not depend on
risk, as Heidi Hurd has done.22 The third would be to
collapse altogether the distinction between objective
wrongdoing and subjective culpability, as Larry Alexander,
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, and Stephen Morse have done.23
This last, and most radical, alternative would assign
probabilities a role in the evaluation of the actor‘s
culpability.24 But the probabilities at work in the culpability
determination would be subjective, not objective. That is,

19. See Lawrence Crocker, Justice in Criminal Liability: Decriminalizing
Harmless Attempts, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1099 (1992) (assigning idealized
observer the role of defining ―the ‗conditions of repetition‘ under which the
probability is to be generated‖); DUFF, supra note 17, at 82 (―[A] ‗reasonable‘
observer will know certain general facts about the world in which she and the
defendant live.‖).
20. Larry Alexander, Inculpatory and Exculpatory Mistakes and the
Fact/Law Distinction: An Essay in Memory of Myke Bayles, 12 L. & PHIL. 33, 67
(1993).
21. See Peter Westen, Resulting Harms and Objective Risks as Constraints on
Punishment, 29 L. & PHIL. 401, 412-13 (2010) (―[A]n alternative concept of ‗risk‘
and ‗danger‘ exists that is neither probabilistic nor factual.‖).
22. See Hurd, supra note 14, at 262-63 (summarizing the view that risk is
ineligible to serve as the touchstone of wrongdoing and that wrongdoing instead
―consists in causally-complex actions‖).
23. See ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 11, at 92 (acknowledging that their
account of criminal law eliminates the traditional distinction between
wrongdoing and culpability).
24. Id. at 62-63.
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the actor‘s liability would depend solely on her ―subjective
beliefs about the probabilities of outcomes.‖25
None of these modifications to the existing law is
necessary. In this paper, I will argue that the theorists have
overlooked a viable alternative method of measuring
objective probabilities. This alternative would measure the
probabilities not on the basis of what the actor herself
believed, nor on the basis of what a hypothetical reasonable
person in her place would have believed, but on the basis of
what the actor knew. There is a difference, of course,
between what the actor knew and what she believed; in
order to qualify as knowledge, a belief must be (at the very
least)26 true and justified.27 Under the proposed alternative,
then, the actor‘s mistaken beliefs would have no effect on
the probability calculation, nor would any fact of which the
actor was ignorant.28 The jury or judge would calculate the
probabilities on the basis of a subset of the world‘s facts,
namely, the subset consisting of just those facts of which the
actor was aware.
What makes this alternative worth exploring is, in part,
its strong footing in the existing law. The Model Penal
Code‘s influential definitions of recklessness and negligence
both require the finder of fact to evaluate the ―nature and
degree‖ of the risk on the basis of ―the circumstances known
to [the actor].‖29 The Code‘s choice of words has gone
unremarked by scholars, who indeed have consistently
25. Id. at 63.
26. See Edmund L. Gettier, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, 23 ANALYSIS
121, 122-23 (1963) (identifying several examples that show the ―justified true
belief‖ definition of knowledge ―does not state a sufficient condition for
someone‘s knowing a given proposition‖).
27. LAURENCE BONJOUR, THE STRUCTURE OF EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE 4 (1985);
see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (―[T]he word
‗knowledge‘ connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.
The term ‗applies to any body of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred
from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds.‘‖) (citation omitted).
28. See ALFRED J. AYER, THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 31 (1956) (defining
knowledge to include, among others, a requirement ―that what is known should
be true‖).
29. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c)-(d) (1985) (emphasis added).
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overlooked the distinction between what the actor knows
and what the actor believes.30 But the Code‘s use of the word
―known‖ plainly was the product of a considered choice by
the Code‘s drafters, who in other sections of the Code made
the actor‘s liability hinge instead on ―the circumstances as
he believes them to be.‖31 An evaluation of this aspect of the
Model Penal Code is overdue.32
This known-circumstances formula is of interest for
another reason as well. The courts have happened upon
exactly the same formula in cases from another subjectmatter area, where probability plays a similar, if more
overt, role: the law of search and seizure. The lawfulness of
a warrantless search or seizure usually depends on whether
the evidence available to the officer satisfied one of two
probability thresholds: the probable cause standard or the
reasonable suspicion standard.33 In applying these two
probability thresholds, the courts measure the objective
probabilities just as the Model Penal Code requires the
factfinder to do in criminal cases: on the basis of ―the facts
and circumstances known to the officer,‖34 rather than on
the basis of the facts as the officers believed them to be.
30. ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 11, at 29-30, 82 (treating ―what the actor
knows‖ as synonymous with what the actor believes); Robinson, supra note 10,
at 388-89 (treating the actor‘s mistaken beliefs as counting among ―the
circumstances known to him‖); Westen, supra note 11, at 544 (assuming that
the purely subjective approach to measuring risk takes as its starting point
whatever ―knowledge . . . the actor himself possesses‖).
31. § 210.3(1)(b) (defining the defense of extreme emotional disturbance)
(emphasis added); § 5.01(1)(c) (defining the elements of criminal attempt)
(emphasis added).
32. See Eric A. Johnson, Is the Idea of Objective Probability Incoherent?, 29 L.
& PHIL. 419, 428-29 (2010) (arguing that the Model Penal Code‘s use of both the
phrase ―circumstances known to him‖ and the phrase ―circumstances as he
believes them to be‖ reflects the drafters‘ awareness of the distinction between
the two).
33. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983) (applying the probable
cause standard to a search conducted pursuant to search warrant); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1968) (applying the reasonable suspicion standard to
protective frisks).
34. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959) (emphasis added) (citing
Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878) (―Probable cause exists if the facts and
circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that an
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Close analysis bears out the intuitions behind the
known-circumstances formula, as I will show in this Article.
I will begin with a brief historical introduction, in which I
will explain where the known-circumstances formula came
from and what it was meant to accomplish. Next, I will
explain how it is possible, paradoxically, to generate agentindependent, or objective, probabilities from what the actor
knows. Third, I will explain how the known-circumstances
formula defines the body of facts or evidence from which the
probabilities are generated, and how the formula can be
refined to overcome the criticisms justly leveled at the
reasonable-person-centered approach to probability. Finally,
I will explore the question why the known circumstances
provide a fair basis for evaluating the justifiability of the
actor‘s conduct.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE KNOWN-CIRCUMSTANCES
FORMULA
The Model Penal Code‘s definitions of recklessness and
negligence share a requirement that the actor‘s conduct
pose a ―substantial and unjustifiable risk.‖35 And they share,
too, a requirement that the factfinder, in evaluating the
nature and degree of the risk, consider ―the circumstances
known to [the actor].‖36 The question arises in connection
with both definitions, then: Exactly what did the Model
Penal Code‘s drafters mean when they said that the factfinder, in evaluating the risk, was to consider the
circumstances known to the actor?
In this Section, I will take a historical approach to this
question. This brief history of the critical phrase will show
three things. First, the Model Penal Code‘s drafters
offense has been committed.‖); see also Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 155
(2004) (holding that the existence of probable cause is evaluated solely on the
basis of ―the facts known to the . . . officers‖ (emphasis added)); Terry, 392 U.S.
at 21-22 (―[A] judge . . . must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search
or seizure in light of . . . the facts available to the officer at the moment of the
seizure or the search.‖).
35. § 2.02(2)(c)-(d).
36. Id.
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understood the difference between evaluating the actor‘s
conduct on the basis of what the actor believed and
evaluating the actor‘s conduct on the basis of what she
knew, and they meant to require the factfinder to evaluate
the actor‘s conduct on the basis of what the actor knew.
Second, the function of the phrase ―circumstances known to
him‖ is to define, in Herbert Wechsler‘s words, a method for
―making . . . probability judgments.‖37 Third, the probability
judgments so derived bear not on the question of the actor‘s
culpability but, rather, on the criminal law‘s objective or
external question, namely, whether the actor‘s conduct—
culpable or not—violated an applicable ―rule of conduct.‖
A. The Formula’s Origins in The Common Law
It is to the Model Penal Code that the knowncircumstances formula owes its footing in the current law.38
But the drafters of the Model Penal Code did not coin the
phrase ―circumstances known to him,‖ nor did they think up
the associated method of measuring probabilities—Holmes
did.39 The known-circumstances formula emerged fully
fledged in The Common Law, where Holmes said of the
criminal law that ―the circumstances in connection with
which the tendency of [a person‘s] act is judged are the
circumstances known to him.‖40 Holmes invoked the same
formula again three years later, in his opinion for the
37. Wechsler & Michael, supra note 1, at 747.
38. See § 2.02(2)(c)-(d) (using the phrase ―circumstances known to him‖ in
defining both recklessness and criminal negligence); see also § 2.02 cmt., at 233
(―[V]irtually all recent legislative revisions and proposals follow [the Model
Penal Code] in setting up general standards of culpability.‖).
39. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 75 (1881). When
Holmes first introduced the idea of judging the probabilities according to the
―known circumstances,‖ he includes a citation to Blackstone. Id. at 57 n.1. But
Blackstone just said that a killing may be murder ―[i]f a man . . . does such an
act, of which the probable consequence may be, and eventually is, death.‖ 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *197. Blackstone‘s only reference to
knowledge appears in an example: ―[I]f a man hath a beast that is used to do
mischief; and he, knowing it, suffers it to go abroad, and it kills man; even this
is manslaughter in the owner.‖ Id.
40. HOLMES, supra note 39, at 75.
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Massachusetts Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Pierce41
affirming the manslaughter conviction of a doctor who had
recklessly killed a patient by making her spend three days
in kerosene-soaked flannels.42 And Holmes invoked the
formula repeatedly, though to less effect, as a Supreme
Court justice.43
The known-circumstances formula was the centerpiece
of Holmes‘s effort in The Common Law to articulate
objective standards of criminal liability.44 In The Common
Law, Holmes famously wanted to make not just criminal
liability but civil liability, too, depend on external or

41. 138 Mass. 165 (1884).
42. Id. According to biographer Edward White, Holmes ―saw the [Pierce] case
as the ideal opportunity to put his theories into practice.‖ G. EDWARD WHITE,
JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 259-61 (1993). In a letter to Frederick
Pollack, Holmes said, ―[i]f my opinion goes through [in Pierce] . . . it will do
much to confirm some theories of my book.‖ Id.
43. See Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913) (―‗An act causing
death may be murder, manslaughter, or misadventure according to the degree of
danger attending it‘ by common experience in the circumstances known to the
actor.‖ (quoting Pierce, 138 Mass. at 178)); Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194,
203 (1904) (―A death is caused of malice aforethought if, under the
circumstances known to the actor, the probability of its ensuing from the act
done is great and manifest according to common experience‖ (citing Pierce, 138
Mass. at 178)); see also Schlemmer v. Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Ry. Co.
205 U.S. 1, 12 (1907) (―Negligence consists in conduct which common experience
or the special knowledge of the actor shows to be so likely to produce the result
complained of, under the circumstances known to the actor, that he is held
answerable for that result, although it was not certain, intended, or foreseen.‖).
44. See HOLMES, supra note 39, at 38 (―[W]hile the law does still and always,
in a certain sense, measure legal liability by moral standards, it nevertheless,
by the very necessity of its nature, is continually transmuting those moral
standards into external or objective ones, from which the actual guilt of the
party concerned is wholly eliminated.‖); see also H. L. A. HART, Diamonds and
String: Holmes on The Common Law, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY 278, 281-84 (1983) (―[Holmes] thought . . . acts should be judged by
their tendency under the known circumstances not by the actual intent which
accompanies them . . . .‖); Gerald Leonard, Towards a Legal History of American
Criminal Theory: Culture and Doctrine from Blackstone to the Model Penal
Code, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 691, 694 n.11 (2003) (―Candidates for a unified
theory of criminal law include . . . Oliver Wendell Holmes‘s reduction of all
criminal law to matters of objective risk-creation in The Common Law.‖).
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―objective‖ standards, rather than subjective ones.45 But
Holmes said that the need for external standards is
particularly compelling in the criminal law, where among
the law‘s aims is the articulation of general standards of
conduct: ―[W]hen we are dealing with that part of the law
which aims more directly than any other at establishing
standards of conduct, we should expect there more than
elsewhere to find that the tests of liability are external.‖46
Holmes returned to the same theme in Pierce, where he said
that the criminal law‘s ―immediate object and task [is to]
establish a general standard, or at least general negative
limits, of conduct for the community.‖47
As Holmes recognized, this task of establishing
standards of conduct sometimes can be accomplished
through the adoption of specific rules, like ―Don‘t drive
when you‘re intoxicated,‖ or ―Don‘t sell plantation bitters.‖48
But many crimes do not lend themselves to rule-like
definitions.49 This is true, for example, of implied-malice
murder and manslaughter, which encompass forms of
conduct too various to be captured by specific rules.50
Murder and manslaughter really only can be defined as
45. Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1314,
1315 (2002) (―Holmes sought to reconceptualize the Anglo-American common
law and by doing so to bring about a variety of reforms, such as the substitution
of ‗objective‘ for ‗subjective‘ principles of criminal and tort liability.‖).
46. HOLMES, supra note 39, at 50.
47. Pierce, 138 Mass. at 176.
48. See HOLMES, supra note 39, at 59 (―[U]nder a prohibitory liquor law, it
has been held that, if a man sells ‗Plantation Bitters,‘ it is no defence that he
does not know them to be intoxicating.‖); see also W. Jonathan Cardi,
Reconstructing Foreseeability, 46 B.C. L. REV. 921, 977 n.288 (2005) (attributing
to Holmes a ―longstanding view that judges [in tort cases] should more actively
apply their cumulative wisdom to prescribe specific duties in categories of
cases‖).
49. See Paul H. Robinson, A Functional Analysis of the Criminal Law, 88 NW.
U. L. REV. 857, 882 (1994) (―Because danger may be created in an infinite
number of ways and in an infinite number of situations, the prohibition [on
criminal risk] must use risk as the defining concept; no specific set of acts and
circumstances can adequately define the prohibited conduct.‖).
50. See Simons, supra note 14, at 320 (―One cannot, for example, simply
define negligent homicide as a killing in which the actor should have realized
that he created a 2%, or 5%, risk of unjustifiably causing death.‖).
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Holmes defined them, namely, according to ―the degree of
danger attending [the actor‘s conduct].‖51 Where crimes like
these are concerned, the best we can hope for by way of
creating general standards of conduct is (in Paul Robinson‘s
words, rather than Holmes‘s) to ―define the real world riskcreation that is prohibited;‖52 to ―tell persons beforehand
which risks—what probability of how serious a harm under
what circumstances—must be avoided.‖53
―Real world risk-creation‖ is difficult to define, though.
What matters, Holmes said in Pierce, cannot be the act‘s
―tendency under all the circumstances actually affecting the
result.‖54 When all the circumstances affecting the result are
taken into account, probabilities are displaced by
certainties.55 Where a bullet ―misses its aim,‖ he said, ―the
act has produced the whole effect possible to it in the course
of nature. It is just as impossible that that bullet under
those circumstances should hit that man, as to pick an
empty pocket.‖56 What is more, even if it were possible
somehow to derive probabilities from all the circumstances,
the probabilities so derived wouldn‘t tell us what we want to
know, namely, whether the actor‘s conduct is wrongful. ―So
far . . . as criminal liability is founded upon wrongdoing in
any sense,‖ Holmes said, it ―must be confined to cases where
circumstances making the conduct dangerous were known
[to the actor].‖57 The probabilities of interest to the criminal
law necessarily are rooted in the actor‘s perspective, then.
On the other hand, the probabilities of interest to the
criminal law, though rooted in the actor‘s perspective,
51. United States v. Nash, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913) (quoting Pierce, 138
Mass. at 178).
52. Robinson, supra note 49, at 884.
53. Id. at 883.
54. Pierce, 138 Mass. at 179.
55. See HOLMES, supra note 39, at 69-70 (addressing the defense of legal
impossibility).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 55; see also id. (―An act cannot be wrong, even when done under
circumstances in which it will be hurtful, unless those circumstances are or
ought to be known.‖); Warren A. Seavey, Negligence—Subjective or Objective?,
41 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1927) (―[R]isk is . . . dependent upon knowledge.‖).
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cannot be merely the probabilities the actor herself assigned
to outcomes. In Pierce, Holmes considered and rejected the
possibility of making the actor‘s liability depend on the
―estimate formed by the actor personally,‖58 or the actor‘s
own ―expectation of good results.‖59 This possibility Holmes
identified with ―recklessness in a moral sense,‖ which
depends, he said, ―on the actual condition of the individual’s
mind with regard to consequences, as distinguished from
mere knowledge of present or past facts or circumstances
from which some one or everybody else might be led to
anticipate or apprehend them if the supposed act were
done.‖60 Requiring recklessness in ―this [moral] sense,‖
Holmes said in Pierce, would be inconsistent with the
criminal law‘s objective of establishing external standards
of conduct for the community.61
This tension—between the demand for external
standards, on the one hand, and the requirement that
probabilities be rooted in the actor‘s perspective, on the
other—Holmes resolved with the known-circumstances
formula. ―[A] man‘s liability for his acts is determined by
their tendency under the circumstances known to him,‖
Holmes said, ―and not by their tendency under all the
circumstances actually affecting the result, whether known
or unknown.‖62 This test is rooted in the actor‘s perspective,
of course. At the same time, though, the test is
fundamentally objective in that it specifies a subset of the
circumstances in the world as the basis for calculating the
probabilities. And it is objective, too, in that the
probabilities derived from these circumstances are
independent of the ―actual condition of the individual‘s mind
with regard to consequences.‖63 The actor‘s mistaken beliefs,
including her mistaken beliefs about consequences, don‘t
matter.
58. Pierce, 138 Mass. at 178.
59. Id. at 176.
60. Id. at 175-76 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 176.
62. Id. at 179.
63. Id. at 175-76.

2011]

KNOWLEDGE, RISK, AND WRONGDOING

521

B. The Formula’s Place in the Model Penal Code
The only current case law that makes direct use of
Holmes‘s formula is from Massachusetts, where the courts
still follow Pierce and its progeny.64 And so Holmes‘s
intentions would be mostly beside the point had not the
formula found its way into the Model Penal Code‘s
definitions of recklessness and criminal negligence and,
from there, into the criminal codes of many states.65 As it is,
Holmes‘s intent is the intent of the Model Penal Code‘s
drafters, who lifted the phrase directly from him; and the
intent of the Model Penal Code‘s drafters is the intent of
many state codes.66
The formula‘s journey from Holmes to the Model Penal
Code is short and easily mapped. The drafters of the Model
Penal Code were familiar with The Common Law, of course,
and they were familiar too with Holmes‘s opinion in
64. See Commonwealth v. Sanna, 674 N.E.2d 1067, 1074 (Mass. 1997)
(holding that implied malice may be inferred ―if, ‗in the circumstances known to
the defendant, a reasonably prudent person would have known that according to
common experience there was a plain and strong likelihood that death would
follow the contemplated act‘‖ (quoting Commonwealth v. Grey, 505 N.E.2d 171
(Mass. 1987))).
65. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt., at 233 (1985) (―[V]irtually all recent
legislative revisions and proposals follow [the Model Penal Code] in setting up
general standards of culpability.‖); see also, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-202(4)(B)
(2006) (defining criminal negligence to require evaluation of ―the circumstances
known to the actor‖); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-206(3)-(4) (1986) (defining
recklessness and criminal negligence to require evaluation of ―the circumstances
known to [the actor]‖); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4101(G) (1976) (defining ―reckless
conduct‖ to require evaluation of ―the circumstances known to [the actor]‖); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. 17-A § 35(3), (4) (1964) (defining recklessness and criminal
negligence to require evaluation of ―the circumstances known to the person‖);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 17-17-67 (1972) (defining recklessness to require evaluation
of ―the circumstances known to [the actor]‖; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:2 (2007)
(defining recklessness and criminal negligence to require evaluation of ―the
circumstances known to [the actor]‖); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(b)(3)-(4) (West
2005) (same); 18 PA. STAT. ANN. § 302(b) (West 1998) (same).
66. See, e.g., Riley v. State, 60 P.3d 204, 212-14 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002)
(relying on intent of Model Penal Code‘s drafters in interpreting state
accomplice liability provision derived from Model Penal Code); Commonwealth
v. Capo, 727 A.2d 1126, 1129 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (―[It is] important to consider
the MPC in interpreting the term.‖).
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Commonwealth v. Pierce.67 In a 1937 law review article that
laid the groundwork for the Model Penal Code‘s treatment
of homicide,68 Herbert Wechsler (who would later serve as
the Code‘s chief reporter) and co-author Jerome Michael
used the phrase ―circumstances known to the actor‖
repeatedly69 and traced the phrase to Holmes.70 They
identified the known-circumstances formula as one of
―various criteria available to measure the degree of
inadvertently created risk.‖71 Under the knowncircumstances criterion, Wechsler and Michael said, the
factfinder ―attempt[s] to estimate [on the basis of common
experience] the probability that death would result from the
act, taking into account only the circumstances known to the
actor.‖72
It is evident not only from the history of the Code but
from its text, too, that the drafters‘ use of the phrase
―circumstances known to him‖ was not unconsidered. Other
sections of the Code require the jury to evaluate the actor‘s
conduct on the basis of ―the circumstances as [the actor]
believes them to be.‖73 This is true, for example, of the Code
67. See Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L.
REV. 1097, 1108 & n.22 (1952) (citing Pierce in connection with the question
whether it is sufficient for criminal liability that the actor knew or should have
known ―the facts that give the conduct its offensive tendency‖); Wechsler &
Michael, supra note 1, at 710 n.31 (citing both Pierce and The Common Law for
the proposition that the actor‘s unawareness of the consequences of his actions
is immaterial ―if under the circumstances known to him‖ the consequences are
obvious).
68. See Wechsler & Michael, supra note 1; see also Kent Greenawalt, A Few
Reflections on the Model Penal Code Commentaries, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 241,
241 (2003) (―[The Model Penal Code‘s] intellectual roots can be traced back to
the late 1930s when Herbert Wechsler and Jerome Michael, in A Rationale of
the Law of Homicide, developed a systematic utilitarian approach to that central
aspect of the criminal law.‖).
69. See Wechsler & Michael, supra note 1, at 710, 734-35.
70. Id. at 710 n.31.
71. Id. at 735.
72. Id. (emphasis added).
73. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(c) (―[A] person employing
protective force may estimate the necessity thereof under the circumstances as
he believes them to be when the force is used.‖); § 3.05(1)(b) (providing that use
of force in defense of another person is to be evaluated on the basis of ―the
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section defining the partial defense of extreme emotional
disturbance, which requires the jury to evaluate the
reasonableness of the actor‘s explanation or excuse ―under
the circumstances as he believes them to be.‖74 It is also true
of the Code section defining the offense of criminal attempt,
which requires the jury to evaluate the actor‘s conduct
―under the circumstances as he believes them to be.‖75 By
opting instead—in the Code‘s definitions of recklessness and
criminal negligence—to require the jury to evaluate the
―nature and degree‖ of the risk on the basis of
―circumstances known to [the actor],‖76 the drafters
signaled, first, that they were cognizant of the difference
between what the actor knows and what the actor believes
and, second, that they meant the jury to measure the risk
on the basis of what the actor knows.77
The Model Penal Code did nothing to change the
substance of the known-circumstances formula. The Model
Penal Code did, however, change the formula‘s place in the
criminal law. For Holmes, criminal liability appeared to
hinge exclusively on the answer to the ―external‖ question,
namely: What is ―the degree of danger shown by experience
to attend the act under [the] circumstances known [to the

circumstances as the actor believes them to be‖); § 5.01(1)(c) (defining the
elements of criminal attempt).
74. Id. § 210.3(1)(b).
75. Id. § 5.01(1)(c).
76. Id. § 2.02(2)(c), (d).
77. Interestingly, the Model Penal Code‘s principal justification defenses—
self defense and choice of evils—both appear to require the jury to assess the
justifiability of the actor‘s conduct on the basis of what the actor ―believe[d],‖
rather than what the actor knew. See id. §§ 3.02(1), 3.04(1). Why, if the Code‘s
drafters thought the ultimate justifiability of conduct hinged on what the actor
knew, would they have defined these justification defenses in terms of what the
actor believed? The paradoxical-sounding answer is that the availability of the
two ―justification‖ defenses does not actually depend on whether the defendant‘s
conduct was, strictly speaking, ―justifiable.‖ The Code acknowledges that even if
a defendant succeeds in establishing one of these two justification defenses in
response to a charge of, say, intentional murder, he may still face prosecution
for reckless or criminally negligent homicide, both of which hinge on a finding
that the conduct was unjustifiable. Id. §§ 3.02(2), 3.09(2).
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actor?]‖78 Holmes expressed doubt about whether the law
requires more than this—about whether ―the actual degree
of personal guilt involved in any particular transgression . .
.is an element at all.‖79 More strongly, he said that ―the
mens rea, or actual wickedness of the party, is wholly
unnecessary, and all reference to the state of his
consciousness is misleading if it means anything more than
that the circumstances in connection with which the
tendency of his act is judged are the circumstances known
to him.‖80
In the Model Penal Code, by contrast, criminal liability
depends on the answers to not one but two questions.81 The
first is the question of ―legality‖ or ―wrongdoing,‖ which
corresponds to Holmes‘s external question, and which asks
essentially whether the actor‘s conduct violated an
external rule of conduct.82 The second is the question of
―culpability,‖ which has no analogue in Holmes, and which
asks whether the actor, despite having violated a rule of
conduct, nevertheless ―does not have the minimum

78. HOLMES, supra note 39, at 75; see also id. at 66 (―Acts should be judged by
their tendency under the known circumstances, not by the actual intent which
accompanies them.‖). But see Fletcher, supra note 10, at 429-30 (―Perhaps
Holmes proceeded in intuitive deference to the distinction between legality and
culpability.‖).
79. HOLMES, supra note 39, at 49.
80. Id. at 75
81. See § 2.02 cmt., at 238, 241 (explaining that the code‘s definitions of
recklessness and criminal negligence require the jury to perform ―two distinct
functions,‖ the first of which involves ―examin[ing] the risk and the factors that
are relevant to how substantial it was and the justifications for taking it,‖ and
the second of which involves deciding whether the defendant‘s conduct ―justifies
condemnation‖); see also MARKUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE
247-49 (2002) (identifying the question whether the actor ―is blameworthy‖ as a
question separate from the questions of legality and justifiability); Fletcher,
supra note 10, at 430 (―The Model Penal Code . . .displays an appreciation for
the distinction between the dimensions of legality and culpability in the
structure of negligence.‖).
82. See Fletcher, supra note 10, at 427-30 (―[T]here is a distinction . . .
between the legality of the conduct and the culpability of the individual who
engages in the conduct . . . . The Model Penal Code . . . displays an appreciation
for [this] distinction.‖).
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blameworthiness required to be held criminally liable for
the violation.‖83
The Code‘s definitions of recklessness and criminal
negligence pose both these questions.84 The question of
wrongdoing is captured by the Code‘s requirement—in both
definitions—that the risk posed by the actor‘s conduct be
―substantial and unjustifiable.‖85 As the Code commentary
explains, however, this assessment of the risk is just the
first of the jury‘s ―two distinct functions‖ in applying the two
definitions.86 Both definitions require the jury to perform a
second function too, namely, to decide whether the actor‘s
conscious disregard of the risk (in recklessness cases) or
failure to perceive the risk (in negligence cases) ―justifies
condemnation.‖87 In addressing this second question, the
jury doesn‘t measure probabilities. It decides, in the words
of the Code commentary, whether the actor‘s creation of the
unjustifiable risk was attributable to a culpable
―insensitivity to the interests of others‖ or instead was

83. Robinson, supra note 49, at 878; see also Herbert Wechsler & Jerome
Michael, A Rationale for the Law of Homicide II, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 1261, 1275
(1937) (explaining the culpability component of criminal negligence); DUBBER,
supra note 81, at 248 (identifying as a separate question under the code
―whether [the actor] is blameworthy—taking into account her relevant personal
characteristics as well as the relevant circumstances of her behavior in this
particular case‖).
84. See FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 6.6.6, at 484-85 (―[The] bifurcation of
negligence into the distinct questions of wrongdoing and attribution [or
culpability] finds an echo in the Model Penal Code‘s structuring of negligence
and recklessness. The issue of wrongdoing is captured in the question whether
the risk is ‗substantial and unjustified‘; the issue of attribution, in the case of
negligence, by the elaborate question whether the actor‘s failure to perceive it . .
. involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person
would observe in the actor‘s situation.‖) (footnote omitted).
85. § 2.02(2)(c), (d); see also Fletcher, supra note 10, at 429 (―Thinking of
negligent conduct as consisting of dimensions both of legality and culpability
leads one to regard the standard for negligence as, at once, objective and
subjective. The objective issue is whether the risk is justified under the
circumstances . . . .‖).
86. § 2.02 cmts. 3-4.
87. Id.
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attributable to an innocent ―intellectual failure to grasp‖ the
significance of the known facts.88
It is in connection with the first of these questions—
Holmes‘s external question, that is—that the jury must
decide the seemingly inward-looking question of what the
actor knew of the facts. The known-circumstances formula,
as Wechsler recognized, is a formula for calculating ―the
probability that [the proscribed harm] would result from the
act.‖89 This probability bears on the question whether the
risk is substantial and unjustifiable.90 And the question
whether the risk is substantial and unjustifiable is what
defines the rule of conduct in cases of recklessness and
negligence.91 Wechsler did not change the external question
framed by Holmes, then. He just added to it a separate
question about the actor‘s culpability, whose answer
depends on more than what the actor knew.92
This history of the formula would be incomplete if it
didn‘t say what happened after the Code was published.
What happened was that the formula was forgotten. Even
the Code commentaries prepared shortly after the Code‘s
adoption make a muddle of the probability question.93
Though the Code‘s definitions of recklessness and
negligence both require the jury to measure the degree of
risk according to the ―circumstances known to [the actor],‖94
The
the
commentaries
overlook
this
parallel.95
88. § 2.02 cmt. 4; see also Wechsler & Michael, supra note 83, at 1275 (―We
cannot avoid asking why the actor did not pay attention when so much turned
out to be at stake.‖).
89. Wechsler & Michael, supra note 1, at 735.
90. See § 2.02 cmt. 3.
91. Robinson, supra note 49, at 883.
92. § 2.02 cmt. 4; see also Wechsler & Michael, supra note 83, at 1275
(explaining culpability question).
93. Some aspects of the final commentaries were drawn from the
commentaries prepared in connection with the various tentative drafts. See
Greenawalt, supra note 67, at 241-43. The portions of the final commentaries
addressed in this paragraph, however, were not present in the tentative drafts.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 3, at 124-26 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955).
94. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c), (d) (1985).
95. Id.
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commentaries say, embarrassingly, that the Code‘s
definition of criminal negligence requires the jury to
evaluate the degree of risk ―in terms of an objective view of
the situation as it actually existed,‖ while the Code‘s
definition of recklessness requires the jury to evaluate the
risk ―from the point of view of the actor‘s perceptions.‖96 For
whatever reason, Wechsler‘s care in resolving the
difficulties associated with the probability question went
unnoticed even by those whom he supervised in the
preparation of the commentaries.97
II. HOW THE FORMULA WORKS, PART 1: DERIVING AGENTINDEPENDENT PROBABILITIES FROM AGENT-DEPENDENT
FACTS
In this Section and the next, I will be more specific
about what it means to calculate probabilities on the basis
of the circumstances known to the actor. The knowncircumstances formula essentially has two working parts.
The first is a method for deriving probabilities from a body
of facts or evidence. The second is a method for defining the
body of facts or evidence from which the probabilities are to
be derived—for defining, in Herbert Wechsler‘s words, ―the
conditions . . . to be taken into account in making the
probability judgments.‖98 I will explain the first of these
working parts in this Section, and the second in the
following Section.
My discussion below of the formula‘s first working part
will be framed as an answer to the so-called ―determination
problem.‖ The determination problem begins with the
recognition that probability calculations based on ―all the
circumstances, known and unknown,‖ always come out as
either 1 or 0. From this recognition, scholars have inferred,
first, that the probabilities of interest to the criminal law
necessarily are rooted in the actor‘s perspective and, second,
96. Id. § 2.02(2)(c), (d) & cmts. 3-4, at 238, 241.
97. See Greenawalt, supra note 68, at 241-42 (describing Wechsler‘s role in
supervising the preparation of the post-adoption commentaries).
98. Weschler & Michael, supra note 1, at 747.
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that the probabilities of interest to the criminal law
necessarily are subjective, rather than objective.99
The paradoxical-sounding answer to this dilemma, as
we‘ll see, is that it is possible to derive objective or agentindependent probabilities from a body of facts or evidence
defined by what the actor knows or believes. To show how
agent-independent probabilities can be derived from agentdependent bodies of fact or evidence, I will turn to the
search and seizure cases, where lawyers and judges
routinely derive ―objective probabilities‖ from bodies of facts
or evidence defined by what the police officer knows. I will
follow this discussion of the search and seizure cases with
two important digressions. The first will say, specifically,
what it means for probabilities to inhere in bodies of facts or
evidence. The second will address some potential objections
to the search and seizure analogy.
A. The Determination Problem
What exactly did Holmes mean when he said that a
bullet that misses its target ―has produced the whole effect
possible to it in the course of nature‖?100 And what do
present-day commentators mean when they say that for an
observer who knows all the facts, ―all events have a
probability of either one or zero (leaving aside quantum
events)‖?101 This ―determination problem‖102 is worth
exploring in slightly more depth, in part because the courts
and commentators still overlook it sometimes,103 and in part
99. See infra text accompanying notes 112-20.
100. HOLMES, supra note 39, at 69-70.
101. ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 11, at 29.
102. Mike Redmayne, Objective Probability and the Assessment of Evidence, 2
L. PROBABILITY & RISK 275, 279 (2003) (referring to this as ―the determination
problem‖).
103. See, e.g., People v. Maciel, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 628, 634 (Ct. App. 2003)
(insisting that probabilities are calculated on the basis of ―all the surrounding
circumstances‖); Albrecht v. State, 658 A.2d 1122, 1141 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1995) (explaining that the reckless-endangerment statute contemplates that
―actual measurement of the magnitude of the risk will be made objectively
without regard to the defendant‘s state of mind‖); State v. Kistenmacher, 436
N.W.2d 168, 171 (Neb. 1989) (holding that factfinder‘s assessment of risk in
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because it is an important point of departure for criminal
law theory.
The determination problem is present in its simplest
form in a case like Commonwealth v. Malone,104 where the
defendant, Malone, was prosecuted for implied-malice
murder after shooting and killing his friend Long during a
game of Russian roulette. Malone had put one bullet in a
five-chamber revolver, then had aimed the gun at Long and
pulled the trigger three times.105 In upholding Malone‘s
murder conviction, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said
that probability of an adverse outcome from one of the three
trigger pulls was ―at least sixty per cent.‖106
Now, this sixty-percent probability figure clearly can‘t
be based on all the objective facts as they existed in the
moment before Malone pulled the trigger. Among the
objective facts of Malone‘s case was—as we know now—the
fact that the bullet was in the third chamber of the revolver.
Thus, if the probabilities were calculated on the basis of all
the objective facts, the probability of an adverse outcome
from the first two trigger pulls would be zero and the
probability of an adverse outcome from the third trigger pull
would be one. The probabilities would disappear, in other
words.107
manslaughter prosecution is ―purely objective‖); § 2.02 cmt. 4, at 241 (asserting
that the Model Penal Code‘s definition of criminal negligence requires the jury
to evaluate the degree of risk ―in terms of an objective view of the situation as it
actually existed‖); MD. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL) 4:26A cmt.
(2007) (―Whether the defendant‘s conduct created a substantial risk of death or
physical injury is an objective determination and is not dependent upon the
subjective belief of the defendant.‖).
104. 47 A.2d 445 (Pa. 1946).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 449. This figure is somewhat misleading. Unless Malone somehow
had committed himself in advance to pulling the gun‘s trigger three times (like
someone who sneezes three times whenever he sneezes at all), his conduct really
consisted of three separate potentially culpable acts, none of which carried a
sixty-percent probability of an adverse outcome. The first carried a risk of
twenty percent. The second carried a risk of twenty-five percent. And the third
act carried a risk of about thirty-three percent.
107. See Johnson, supra note 32, at 422-23 (using Commonwealth v. Malone to
illustrate the determination problem). This paragraph and the preceding
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Nor is this determination problem confined to cases like
Malone, where the objective fact that pre-determined the
outcome—the presence of the bullet in the third chamber—
was readily ascertainable afterwards. Consider People v.
Knoller,108 where the fatal attack was triggered partly by
complex neural events in the dogs‘ brains.109 It is not
possible now to reconstruct the physical conditions, neural
and otherwise, that existed in the moments before the
attack. Because the world is deterministic,110 however, it is
possible to infer—from the fact that the attack occurred—
that these physical conditions, whatever they were, were so
constituted as to make the attack inevitable. Even in cases
like Knoller‘s, then, the jury always will be able to infer,
from the fact that the result did or did not occur, that the
―objective‖ probability of the result occurring was either one
or zero.111
The determination problem appears to show that the
probabilities of interest to the criminal law presuppose the
adoption of someone‘s perspective. After all, if statements
about probabilities cannot be based on ―all the
circumstances actually affecting the result,‖112 then they
must be based, as Herbert Wechsler said, on a factual setup

paragraph are excerpted, with few modifications, from Johnson, supra note 32,
at 422-23.
108. 158 P.3d 731 (Cal. 2007).
109. Id. at 736-37.
110. See GREENE, supra note 15, at 341 (explaining that quantum weirdness
―does not leave the concept of determinism in total ruins‖; rather, ―quantum
determinism replaces Laplace‘s classical determinism‖); LAPLACE, supra note 13,
at 4 (―[For] an intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by which
nature is animated and the respective situation of the beings who compose it[,] .
. . nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the past, would be present to
its eyes.‖).
111. See Crocker, supra note 19, at 1098; see also Matthew D. Adler, Risk,
Death and Harm: The Normative Foundations of Risk Regulation, 87 MINN. L.
REV. 1293, 1386 (2003) (―If the connection between macroscopic events and
human death is deterministic, only those persons who will actually die as a
result of such events are ‗put at risk‘ by them in the hypothetical fullinformation Bayesian sense.‖).
112. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 179 (1884).
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containing ―some but not all‖ of those circumstances.113 This
constraint on the factual setup, in turn, suggests just the
kinds of limitations imposed by the adoption of a particular
person‘s perspective.114 To be sure, it might be possible to
generate probabilities by ―limiting Nature‘s level of focus,‖115
or by taking ―some wider [but still objective] view of the
circumstances
short
of
that
revealed
by
total
omniscience.‖116 The law, however, traditionally has
generated probabilities not by blurring the facts but by
specifying a perspective.117 This far, anyway, the lessons of
the determination problem are uncontroversial.
The trouble arises with the next step. From the fact
that probability statements appear to presuppose the
adoption of someone‘s perspective, some commentators have
inferred that ―[t]here is no gap between the actor‘s
subjective estimate of the risk and the ‗true‘ or ‗objective‘
risk‖118 and that objective risk, therefore, is ―illusory.‖119 This
move is grounded on two intermediate premises, both of
which seem plausible enough at first glance. The first,
which even Holmes would grant, is that the perspective on
which the actor‘s liability depends is her own. The second is
that adopting the actor‘s perspective necessarily means
adopting, perhaps among other things, her beliefs about the
probabilities of outcomes—her ―subjective estimate of the
113. Wechsler & Michael, supra note 1, at 746 & n.167 (citing Pierce, 138
Mass. at 179).
114. See Seavey, supra note 57, at 7 (―[T]o find risk, we must take the
standpoint of some person who has imperfect knowledge, since if one were
omniscient there would be certainty and hence no risk.‖).
115. Redmayne, supra note 102, at 281.
116. Wechsler & Michael, supra note 1, at 735.
117. This is nicely illustrated by Long v. State, 931 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1996), where the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that a
stalking statute‘s use of the phrase ―reasonably likely‖ was ambiguous because
the statute did not specify the perspective from which this probability
determination was to be made. Id. at 289.
118. ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 11, at 31; see also Seavey, supra note 57, at
6-7 (arguing that adoption of an actor‘s perspective necessarily makes the risk
―purely subjective‖).
119. ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 11, at 31.
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risk[s],‖ in other words.120 If both premises are correct, then
the determination problem appears to show that the
probabilities of interest to the criminal law necessarily are
subjective, not objective.
B. Redefining Objective Probability
Holmes solved the determination problem by
distinguishing two ways in which the finder of fact might
make use of the actor‘s perspective in calculating the
relevant probabilities. For one, the finder of fact might
make use of the actor‘s perspective just by adopting the
probabilities the actor herself assigned to outcomes.121
Alternatively, though, the finder of fact might make use of
the actor‘s perspective by deriving probabilities from what
the actor knows or believes122 about the surrounding
circumstances.123 Probabilities derived from what the actor
knows or believes about the surrounding circumstances are
subjective in one sense, since they are derived from a factual
setup defined in part by the scope of the actor‘s subjective
awareness. But they are objective in the sense that they are
independent of the probabilities the actor herself assigned
to the relevant outcomes.
This kind of objectivity is what Keynes had in mind
when he said that ―once the facts are given which determine
our knowledge, what is probable or improbable in these
120. Id.
121. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 176, 178 (1884) (referring to the
possibility of evaluating the actor‘s conduct on the basis of an ―estimate formed
by the actor personally,‖ or the actor‘s own ―expectation of good results‖).
122. I later explain why the derivation of probabilities from the actor‘s beliefs
is problematic. See infra text accompanying notes 199-201. I mention the
possibility of deriving probabilities from the actor‘s beliefs only to emphasize
that the objective character of the conditional probabilities so derived does not
depend on the truth of the ―particular propositions we select as the premises.‖
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY 4 (1921). It depends, rather,
on the relationship between the premises (or the evidence) and the conclusion.
123. Pierce, 138 Mass. at 175-76 (―[Recklessness] is understood to depend on
the actual condition of the individual‘s mind with regard to consequences, as
distinguished from mere knowledge of present or past facts or circumstances
from which some one or everybody else might be led to anticipate or apprehend
them if the supposed act were done.‖).
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circumstances has been fixed objectively, and is
independent of our opinion.‖124 More to the point, the
underlying idea—that it is possible to derive agentindependent probabilities from a body of facts or
circumstances defined by what the agent believes or
knows—is uncontroversial, at least among lawyers.125 It is
commonplace for lawyers and judges to refer to the
probabilities inherent in126 or generated by127 a body of facts
124. KEYNES, supra note 122, at 4. I do not mean to endorse Keynes‘s specific
method for deriving objective probabilities from facts, which has been the
subject of considerable controversy among probability theorists. See, e.g., J.
Franklin, Resurrecting Logical Probability, 55 ERKENNTNIS 277, 288-90 (2001);
Donald Gillies, Intersubjective Probability and Confirmation Theory, 42 BRIT. J.
FOR PHIL. SCI. 513, 521-24 (1991); Jochen Runde, Keynes After Ramsey: In
Defence of A Treatise on Probability, 25 STUD. HIST. & PHIL. SCI. 97, 97-98
(1993).
125. It is not, incidentally, uncontroversial among probability theorists. See,
e.g., Bruno De Finetti, Probabilism, 31 ERKENNTNIS 169, 174 (1989) (―By
denying any objective value to probability I mean to say that, however an
individual evaluates the probability of a particular event, no experience can
prove him right, or wrong; nor, in general, could any conceivable criterion give
any objective sense to the distinction one would like to draw, here, between
right and wrong.‖).
126. See, e.g., United States v. De Vivo, 190 F. Supp. 483, 486-87 (E.D.N.Y.
1961) (―While the circumstances of the consent must be carefully examined,
more reliance seems to be upon objective evidence of the state of mind and
circumstances and the inherent probabilities arising therefrom.‖); People v.
Vasquez, 82 Cal. Rptr. 131, 138 (Ct. App. 1969) (holding that evidence was
sufficient to support defendant‘s conviction for heroin possession, given ―the
probabilities and improbabilities inherent in all [the] circumstances‖).
127. See, e.g., City of Minot v. Rubbelke, 456 N.W.2d 511, 513 (N.D. 1990)
(reviewing a jury instruction that told the jury in a criminal case to decide
whether the prosecution had ―produce[d] evidence which generates a high
degree of probability or persuasive force‖); Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1535 (1999) (identifying
as a factor bearing on the defendant‘s decision whether to testify ―the
probability of guilt generated‖ by other evidence); Margaret Raymond, Down on
the Corner, Out in the Street: Considering the Character of the Neighborhood in
Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 99, 132-33 (1999) (referring
to ―the probability of criminal conduct generated by [a particular body of]
evidence‖); James J. Tomkovicz, Divining and Designing the Future of the
Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine: Avoiding Instability, Irrationality, and
Infidelity, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1439 (2007) (―Consequently, an officer
possesses the authority to conduct a search incident to arrest as long as he has
taken a person into custody on the basis of facts that generate a ‗fair probability‘
that the arrestee has committed or is committing an offense.‖).
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or evidence, and to assume that it is possible to be wrong, or
right, about these probabilities.128 This is nowhere clearer
than in the search and seizure cases.
Probability plays a more overt role in the law of search
and seizure than it plays in criminal law. Usually, in search
and seizure cases, the only question for the factfinder is
whether the evidence available to the officer who conducted
the search or seizure, or to the judge who issued the
warrant, satisfied one of two invariant probability
thresholds: the probable cause standard, which the Fourth
Amendment itself uses explicitly to define the
circumstances in which full-blown searches and seizures are
justified;129 or the reasonable suspicion standard, which the
Supreme Court developed in Terry v. Ohio130 to define the
circumstances in which investigatory stops and protective
frisks are justified.131
Under both these standards, the probabilities at issue
are ―objective,‖ according to the Court. Probable cause is an
―objective standard[] of conduct,‖ which does not ―depend on
the subjective state of mind of the officer,‖ the Court
explained in Devenpeck v. Alford.132 The reasonable
suspicion standard too is an ―objective standard,‖ as the
Court said in Terry.133 Of course, what the Court means by
objective is not that the probabilities at issue are based on
128. See ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD 117 (1999) (―[I]n
testimony cases it looks as if jurors, for example, work hard at trying to get
accurate estimates of such probabilities, which seems to presume objective facts
concerning such probabilities.‖).
129. See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971) (―[S]ufficient probability . .
. is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.‖); Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (―In dealing with probable cause, . . .
as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities.‖); Llaguno v. Mingey, 763
F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1985) (―Probable cause—the area between bare suspicion
and virtual certainty—describes not a point but a zone, within which the graver
the crime the more latitude the police must be allowed.‖).
130. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
131. Id. at 27; see also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)
(observing that the question of reasonable suspicion deals ―with probabilities‖).
132. 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004).
133. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22.
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all the circumstances. Taking into account all the
circumstances would mean, for example, taking into account
the fact that the suspect‘s car had twenty pounds of
marijuana hidden in the trunk, as the officer learned when
he conducted the challenged search. If facts like these were
taken into account, then the requirement of probable cause
would collapse; successful searches always would be lawful.
What the Court means by objective, rather, is just what
Holmes meant by external. Namely, that the probabilities
are derived objectively from a body of facts defined by what
the actor knows. The Court consistently has said that the
basis for the probability calculation is ―the facts and
circumstances known to the officer.‖134 And the Court
consistently has recognized, too, that probabilities derived
from ―the facts and circumstances known to the officer‖ are
independent of the probabilities assigned to outcomes by the
officer herself.
In Devenpeck, for example, the question whether Officer
Devenpeck had probable cause to arrest Alford for
impersonating a police officer turned exclusively on what
Devenpeck knew about the underlying facts—for example,
that Alford had ―wig-wag‖ headlights and was carrying
handcuffs and a police scanner in his car.135 It was of no
moment that Officer Devenpeck had not arrested Alford for
this offense, and seems not to have considered the
possibility that Alford had committed it.136 Likewise, in
134. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959) (citing Stacey v. Emery,
97 U.S. 648, 645 (1878) (―Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances
known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has
been committed.‖); see also Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153 (―Our cases make clear
that an arresting officer‘s state of mind (except for the facts he knows) is
irrelevant to the existence of probable cause.‖); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 149 (1925) (―If the search and seizure without a warrant are made
upon probable cause, that is, a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances
known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that
which by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are
valid.‖); Emery, 97 U.S. at 645 (―If the facts and circumstances before the officer
are such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the
offence has been committed, it is sufficient.‖).
135. Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 149.
136. Id. at 149, 153-54.
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Terry, the question whether Officer McFadden had
reasonable suspicion justifying a stop of Terry and his
companions depended exclusively on what McFadden knew
about the men‘s movements outside the drug store.137 It was
beside the point that McFadden was ―thoroughly
suspicious.‖138
The probabilities so derived are objective in more than
word, moreover. The Court has long recognized that Fourth
Amendment protections depend critically on not crediting
the officer‘s estimate of the probabilities. In Beck v. Ohio,139
for example, the Court said that the protection afforded by
the Fourth Amendment would be meaningless if the
existence of probable cause depended solely on whether the
officer subjectively believed herself to have probable
cause.140 ―If subjective good faith alone were the test, the
protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and
the people would be ‗secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects,‘ only in the discretion of the police.‖141 Likewise,
in Terry the Court said: ―it is imperative that the facts be
judged against an objective standard,‖ that is, be judged on
the basis of ―the facts available to the officer at the moment
of the seizure or the search.‖142 ―Anything less,‖ the Court
said, ―would invite intrusions upon constitutionally
guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than
inarticulate hunches.‖143
In summary, the lessons of the search and seizure cases
are threefold. First, the practice of deriving rough, intuitive
probabilities from bodies of facts or evidence has solid
credentials in the experience of judges and lawyers in the
137. Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.
138. Id.
139. 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
140. Id. at 97.
141. Id.
142. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22.
143. Id. at 22; see also Beck, 379 U.S. at 97 (―If subjective good faith alone were
the test [of probable cause], the protections of the Fourth Amendment would
evaporate, and the people would be ‗secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects,‘ only in the discretion of the police.‖).
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search and seizure cases.144 Second, probabilities so derived
are objective in the sense that they are independent of the
probabilities assigned to outcomes by the actor herself.
Third, this sort of objectivity goes a long way toward
accomplishing what Holmes meant to accomplish with the
known-circumstances formula, namely, the creation of
meaningful external standards of conduct.
C. How Probabilities Inhere in Circumstances
Though the idea that probabilities inhere in bodies of
facts is likely to seem intuitive to most lawyers, it requires
clarification in one important respect.145 There are at least
two different ways in which probabilities might inhere in a
body of facts.146 First, probabilities might inhere in the facts
physically, in a way that could be discovered by running the
same factual setup over and over.147 Second, the
probabilities might inhere in the facts evidentially or
epistemically, in a way that could be determined by
applying reason or shared experience to the factual setup.148
144. Cf. LLOYD L. WEINREB, LEGAL REASON 12 (2005) (―[Reasoning by analogy]
is a valid, albeit undemonstrable, form of reasoning that stands on its own and
has its own credentials, which are not derived from abstract reason but are
rooted in the experience and knowledge of the lawyers and judges who employ
it.‖).
145. This clarification will prove important later. See infra text accompanying
notes 220-44.
146. See IAN HACKING, THE EMERGENCE OF PROBABILITY 123 (2d ed. 2006)
(distinguishing ―aleatory probabilities‖ from ―epistemic probabilities‖).
147. See MARIA GALAVOTTI, PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY 109
(2005) (describing how Karl Popper‘s propensity theory of probability associates
probability with propensities that inhere physically in ―the experimental
arrangement (or set-up) in which experiments take place‖); IAN HACKING, AN
INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY AND INDUCTIVE LOGIC 132-33 (2001) (observing
that when we talk about frequency-type or propensity-type probabilities, ―[w]e
are talking about a physical property of the coin, which can be investigated by
experiment‖); CLARENCE IRVING LEWIS, AN ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE AND
VALUATION 270-71 (1946) (describing the ―empiricist manner of interpreting
probability‖ and distinguishing this ―empirical interpretation‖ from logical
theories of probability).
148. See HACKING, supra note 147, at 130 (acknowledging that statements
about probability sometimes can be understood as statements about the
probability ―[r]elative to the available evidence‖); Seavey, supra note 57, at 8
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The Pierce case illustrates the difference between these
two ways of talking about—and deriving—probabilities. In
1883, when Pierce killed Mary Bemis by making her spend
three days in kerosene-soaked flannels, kerosene had been
around for only thirty years.149 If Pierce‘s conduct had
occurred not in 1883 but in 1853, the probability of harm
from his conduct would in one sense have been exactly the
same. After all, the physical properties of kerosene and of
human bodies were the same in 1853 as they were in 1883.
And these physical properties, in 1853 as in 1883, would
have made themselves felt in an experiment whose
conditions of repetition were defined by the facts known to
or believed by Pierce.
In another sense, though, the probability of harm from
Pierce‘s conduct was different in 1883 than it would have
been in 1853. It is possible to approach the question of
probability as an evidential question, rather than as a
question about ―physical propensities.‖150 On this approach,
the facts known to Pierce would be treated as defining not
―conditions of repetition‖ but, rather, a body of evidence.
The probabilities would be derived from this body of
evidence by the application ―of reason and of those
experiences which are common to men generally.‖151 In
1853, when kerosene was not in common use, kerosene‘s
toxicity likely would not have been part of a body of
evidence defined by what Pierce knew. Nor would
kerosene‘s toxicity have figured in the factfinder‘s
probability calculation as part of ―those experiences which
are common to men generally.‖152 By 1883, by contrast,
(observing that the derivation of probabilities in civil negligence cases is a
―purely intellectual process‖).
149. See 6 ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA 815 (15th ed. 2007) (―Kerosine was first
manufactured in the 1850s . . . .‖).
150. See HACKING, supra note 147, at 139 (acknowledging that probability may
be approached either as ―a matter of physical propensities‖ or as a question
about the ―relation between hypotheses and evidence‖).
151. State v. Manning, 224 N.W.2d 232, 236 (Iowa 1974) (quoting Purcell v.
Tribbles, 69 N.W. 1120, 1121 (Iowa 1897)) (explaining how juries decide what
inferences to draw from the evidence adduced at trial).
152. Id.
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kerosene‘s toxicity would have been widely known,153 and so
this property would have made itself felt in the probability
calculation either as part of the body of evidence or as part
of common experience.
It is this second, evidential sense of probability on which
the actor‘s criminal liability depends under the knowncircumstances formula. Granted, Holmes refers sometimes
to an act‘s ―tendency‖ under the known circumstances,154
and it is tempting to suppose that he means by ―tendency‖
roughly what philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce meant
when he referred to the ―would-be‖ of a factual setup.155
Peirce said, for example, that a probability statement about
a die thrown from a dice box is equivalent to a statement
―that the die has certain ‗would-be‘.‖156 To say that a die has
a certain ―would-be,‖ he explained, is ―to say that it has a
property, quite analogous to any habit that a man might
have,‖157 which would make itself known in repeated trials
of the same setup. On this view, then, the circumstances
known to the actor would define ―the ‗conditions of
repetition‘ under which the probability is to be generated.‖158
This is not Holmes‘s view, despite his use of the word
―tendency.‖ When pressed to say what probability means,
Holmes identifies probability not with the physical
propensities of the factual setup to produce a certain
outcome but, rather, with the teachings of experience.
Probability, he says in The Common Law, is measured
153. See THOMAS HAWKES TANNER, MEMORANDA ON POISONS 63 (Henry
Leffman, 9th ed. 1902) (describing symptoms and treatment of kerosene
poisoning).
154. See Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 179 (1883); HOLMES, supra
note 39, at 75.
155. CHARLES S. PEIRCE, The Doctrine of Chances, in ESSAYS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 79-80 (Vincent Tomas ed., 1957); see also HACKING,
supra note 147, at 133 (identifying ―tendency‖ as a word associated with
frequency- or propensity-type theories of probability).
156. PEIRCE, supra note 155, at 79-80.
157. Id.
158. Crocker, supra note 19, at 1099 (treating the question of probability in
criminal cases as a problem of defining ―the ‗conditions of repetition‘ under
which the probability is to be generated‖).
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according to ―the common working of natural causes as
shown by experience.‖159 He articulates the same view in the
Pierce case, where he says that the relevant probability is
―the degree of danger which common experience shows to
attend the act under the circumstances known to the
actor.‖160 The same view is implicit, moreover, in Holmes‘s
insistence that ―[t]he test of foresight is . . . what a man of
reasonable prudence would have foreseen.‖161
Holmes‘s view appears to be right. For one thing,
criminal cases are usually, if not always, about unique,
unrepeatable events. And probability theorists appear to
agree that the assignment of frequency- or propensity-type
probabilities
to
unique,
unrepeatable
events
is
162
problematic. For another thing, the use of propensity-type
probabilities would undercut one of the reasons for adopting
the known-circumstances formula. One of the reasons for
adopting the known-circumstances formula, again, is that
―[s]o far . . . as criminal liability is founded upon wrongdoing in any sense, . . . [it] must be confined to cases where
circumstances making the conduct dangerous were known
[to the actor].‖163 It makes no more sense to hold an actor
responsible for the effects of undiscovered causal
mechanisms, as a propensity-type theory effectively would
do, than to hold the actor responsible for the effects of
unknown physical facts.

159. HOLMES, supra note 39, at 67 (emphasis added).
160. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 178 (1883) (emphasis added).
161. HOLMES, supra note 39, at 54.
162. See, e.g., DONALD GILLIES, PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF PROBABILITY 124
(2000) (arguing that Karl Popper‘s propensity theory of probability does not
succeed in justifying ―the introduction of objective singular probabilities‖);
RICHARD VON MISES, PROBABILITY, STATISTICS AND TRUTH 11 (Hilda Geiringer ed.,
George Allen & Unwin. 1957) (1939) (―The phrase ‗probability of death‘, when it
refers to a single person, has no meaning at all for us.‖); HACKING, supra note
147, at 136 (―It does not make sense to speak of the ‗frequency‘ of a single
event.‖).
163. HOLMES, supra note 39, at 55; see also id. (―An act cannot be wrong, even
when done under circumstances in which it will be hurtful, unless those
circumstances are or ought to be known.‖); Seavey, supra note 57, at 6 (arguing
that risk is ―dependent upon knowledge‖).
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Finally, Holmes‘s view is in keeping with legal usage.
The law usually treats probability as ―a relation between
hypotheses and evidence,‖ rather than as ―a matter of
physical propensities.‖164 And it usually treats the derivation
of probabilities as a ―purely intellectual process,‖ rather
than as an experimental one.165 This is true in particular of
the law of search and seizure. In the search and seizure
cases, the courts have acknowledged, for example, that
where a police officer testifies that she noticed the odor of
patchouli oil before searching the defendant‘s car for drugs,
her testimony won‘t help establish probable cause unless
she also testifies that she knew that patchouli oil sometimes
was used to mask the odor of marijuana; it is not enough for
the government to show that patchouli oil is in fact
associated with drug-trafficking.166 What matters, then, is
not whether the factual setup defined by what the actor
knows actually has a certain propensity, which could be
discovered by running the setup over and over again. What
matters is whether the body of evidence defined by what the
actor knows includes that propensity in the form of
background knowledge.
D. Some Objections to the Search-and-Seizure Analogy
The analogy between criminal law and the law of search
and seizure seems vulnerable to objection on a number of
grounds. First, one might argue that search and seizure‘s
use of fixed probability thresholds reflects deep differences
between probability‘s function in the law of search and
seizure and its function in criminal law. In criminal law,
after all, the factfinder‘s probability determination usually
164. See HACKING, supra note 147, at 139.
165. Seavey, supra note 57, at 7-8 (arguing that the derivation of ―the
mathematical chance of injury‖ from the hypothesized facts or circumstance in
civil negligence cases is a ―purely intellectual process‖).
166. See United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 362 (10th Cir. 1989) (upholding
an investigatory stop where the officer detected a strong odor of patchouli oil
and the officer knew that patchouli was used by drug traffickers to mask the
smell of marijuana); cf. Flood v. State, 2007 WY 167, ¶23, 169 P.3d 538, 546
(Wyo. 2007) (recounting a state trooper‘s testimony that drug traffickers often
use patchouli and other strong scents to mask the smell of marijuana).
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is but one part of a broader inquiry into the justifiability of
the actor‘s conduct. In recklessness and negligence cases, for
example, the justifiability of the actor‘s conduct will depend
not only on the probability of harm posed by the conduct,
but also on the magnitude of the potential harm and on the
countervailing benefits of the actor‘s conduct.167 This means,
as Glanville Williams said, that in criminal cases ―the
degree of probability of the consequence‖ that will qualify as
unjustifiable ―must vary in each instance with the
magnitude of the harm foreseen and the degree of utility of
the conduct.‖168
But this difference between criminal law and the law of
search and seizure is superficial; probability‘s role in search
and seizure, though more overt, is fundamentally the same
as its role in criminal law. The ultimate question in search
and seizure cases really is a question about justifiability, as
the Supreme Court has acknowledged.169 ―[I]n principle [, if
not in practice,] every Fourth Amendment case, since it
turns upon a ‗reasonableness‘ determination, involves a
balancing of all relevant factors.‖170 What is more, the
―relevant factors‖ at work in the law of search and seizure
are basically the same as the factors at work in the criminal
law. In search and seizure, the justifiability of the police
167. See Joshua Dressler, Does One Mens Rea Fit All?: Thoughts on
Alexander’s Unified Conception of Criminal Liability, 88 CAL. L. REV. 955, 957
(2000) (―To determine justifiability [in connection with recklessness], we conduct
a criminal law version of the Learned Hand formula for measuring civil
negligence . . . .‖); Hurd & Moore, supra note 11, at 393 & n.144 (assuming that
conduct will qualify as ―reckless‖ under the Model Penal Code only if the risk is
unjustified in the sense required by the Hand formula); see also Leo Katz, A
Look at Tort Law with Criminal Law Blinders, 76 B.U. L. REV. 307, 308 (1996)
(―The drafters of the Model Penal Code seem to have been so taken by this claim
[that the Hand formula clearly captures our intuitions about the meaning of
negligence] as to adopt a formulation pretty close to it: They define negligence
as the taking of a substantial, unjustifiable risk.‖); Wechsler & Michael, supra
note 1, at 744 (―[T]he desirability of preventing a particular act because it may
result in death[] turns upon[, among other things,] (1) the probability that death
or serious injury will result; [and] (2) the probability that the act will also have
desirable results and the degree of their desirability . . . .‖).
168. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, § 26, at 62 (emphasis added).
169. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817 (1996).
170. Id.

2011]

KNOWLEDGE, RISK, AND WRONGDOING

543

officer‘s conduct essentially depends on three factors: (1) the
degree of probability that the officer will find what or whom
she is looking for; (2) the weight of the public interest
served by the search or seizure; and (3) the nature and
scope of the intrusion.171
What distinguishes the question of justifiability in
search and seizure law from the question of justifiability in
criminal law is just that ―the requisite ‗balancing‘ has
[already] been performed in centuries of precedent,‖ as
Justice Brennan said in Dunaway v. New York.172 In search
and seizure cases, the two other factors in the justifiability
calculus—―the magnitude of the harm foreseen‖ and ―the
degree of utility of the conduct‖173—vary only within a
narrow range, and so it is possible for the law to fix in
advance ―the degree of probability of the consequence‖ that
will make the conduct unjustifiable.174 It is telling,
moreover, that when either of these two other factors falls
outside the normal range—when a search or seizure is
unusually intrusive,175 say, or when the search or seizure
serves some government interest other than the

171. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 561 (1980) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (―The reasonableness of a stop turns on . . . (i) the public interest
served by the seizure, (ii) the nature and scope of the intrusion, and (iii) the
objective facts upon which the law enforcement officer relied in light of his
knowledge and expertise.‖); see also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979)
(holding that the reasonableness of a seizure other than a full-blown arrest
―involves a weighing of [1] the gravity of the public concern served by the
seizure, [2] the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and [3]
the severity of the interference with individual liberty‖).
172. 442 U.S. 200, 214 (1979); see also Whren, 517 U.S. at 817 (―[W]ith rare
exceptions . . ., the result of that balancing is not in doubt where the search or
seizure is based upon probable cause.‖); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329
(1987) (―Our disagreement with the dissenters pertains to where the proper
balance should be struck; we choose to adhere to the textual and traditional
standard of probable cause.‖).
173. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, § 26, at 62.
174. Id.
175. Whren, 517 U.S. at 818 (recognizing that when a search or seizure is
unusually intrusive a case-by-case balancing of the government and individual
interests will be required).
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government‘s usual interest in gathering evidence176—the
courts abandon the two invariant probability thresholds in
favor of a case-by-case reasonableness determination.
The reason why probability matters in the law of search
and seizure is, finally, the same as the reason why it
matters in criminal law, then. The justifiability of a person‘s
actions—whether undertaken as a private citizen or as a
police officer—usually is determined by the actions‘
expected outcomes, and the value of an expected outcome
will vary not just in relation to the magnitude of the
potential harm or benefit, but in relation to the probability
that the harm or benefit will occur.177
A second objection to the analogy between criminal law
and search and seizure is that the criminal law is partly or
mostly about culpability, while the law of search and
seizure isn‘t (or wasn‘t, until the Supreme Court broadened
the good-faith exception in Herring v. United States178). But
this objection is grounded on a misunderstanding of
probability‘s role in the criminal law. As we have seen,
criminal law has both a wrongdoing dimension and a
176. See id. at 817-18 (recognizing that when the government interest
advanced by the search or seizure is something other than the government‘s
traditional interest in gathering evidence—as it is in special needs cases—the
usual probability thresholds will not apply and a case-by-case balancing will be
performed).
177. Lawyers often associate this lesson with the Learned Hand formula.
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (―[I]f the
probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon
whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL.‖). However, the
basic point is as old, and as uncontroversial, as the idea of probability itself. See
HACKING, supra note 139, at 9, 77. It had already taken its current form by
1662, when the authors of the Port-Royal Logic said: ―[I]n order to decide what
we ought to do to obtain some good or avoid some harm, it is necessary to
consider not only the good or harm in itself, but also the probability that it will
or will not occur.‖ ANTOINE ARNAULD & PIERRE NICOLE, LOGIC OR THE ART OF
THINKING 273-74 (Jill Vance Buroker trans., 1996).
178. 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009). In Herring, the Court said that ―[t]he fact that a
Fourth Amendment violation occurred—i.e., that a search or arrest was
unreasonable—does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies.‖
Id. at 700. The applicability of the exclusionary rule depends, too, the Court
said, on the separate question whether the officer‘s conduct was ―sufficiently
culpable.‖ Id. at 702.
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distinct culpability dimension.179 Probabilities derived by
application of the known-circumstances formula bear on the
wrongdoing dimension, not the culpability dimension; they
tell us whether the actor violated a rule of conduct, not
whether the actor, despite having violated a rule of conduct,
is not deserving of condemnation.180 It is beside the point,
then, that the criminal law has a culpability dimension that
the law of search and seizure lacks. The criminal law and
the law of search and seizure share a wrongdoing or ―rulearticulation‖ function,181 and it is in service of this function
that the courts in both settings measure the probabilities.
A third potential objection to the search-and-seizure
analogy is that search and seizure differs from the criminal
law in the kinds of facts to which probabilities are assigned.
The criminal law seems usually to concern itself with the
probability that some future harm will come about as a
consequence of the actor‘s conduct. In a reckless
manslaughter case, for example, the probability at issue is
the probability that someone would die as the result of the
actor‘s conduct. In contrast, the law of search and seizure
seems to concern itself with the probabilities attached to
existing states of affairs, e.g., whether the suspect‘s car
contains illegal drugs.
But criminal law and the law of search and seizure are
not really different in this respect. First, it would be wrong
to assume that the criminal law concerns itself exclusively
with the probabilities that attach to future events.182 In a
prosecution for rape, for example, the defendant‘s liability
might hinge on the probability that the victim had given her
consent when the sex act occurred.183 And in child sexual
abuse cases, the defendant‘s liability might hinge on the
179. See supra text accompanying notes 81-88.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 89-92.
181. See Robinson, supra note 49, at 857 (describing criminal law‘s legality or
wrongdoing dimension as concerned with ―rule articulation‖).
182. See FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 4.3, at 262.
183. See, e.g., Reynolds v. State, 664 P.2d 621, 625 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983)
(holding that the state statute defining the offense of first-degree sexual assault
requires the government to prove that the defendant ―recklessly disregarded his
victim‘s lack of consent‖).
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probability the victim was underage.184 Indeed, this
possibility is anticipated by the Model Penal Code‘s
definitions of recklessness and criminal negligence, both of
which are ―designed to apply to cases of mistakes about
attendant circumstances as well as to mistakes involved in
causing harm.‖185
Second, it would be wrong to assume that the law of
search and seizure always, or even usually, concerns itself
with probabilities that attach to existing conditions. The
Supreme Court addressed this question in United States v.
Grubbs,186 where a criminal defendant argued that the
Fourth Amendment does not authorize anticipatory search
warrants, that is, warrants ―based upon an affidavit
showing probable cause that at some future time (but not
presently) certain evidence of crime will be located at a
specified place.‖187 The Court rejected this argument, and in
the course of doing so explained that all search warrants,
not just anticipatory warrants, are really based on a
prediction about future events: in every case, ―the
magistrate‘s determination that there is probable cause for
the search amounts to a prediction that the item will still be
there when the warrant is executed.‖188
Finally, there is no reason to suppose that the
distinction between probabilities attached to future
outcomes, on the one hand, and probabilities attached to
existing conditions, on the other, is a fundamental one, at
least for our purposes.189 Probabilities are relative to human
184. See, e.g., State v. Elton, 680 P.2d 727, 729-30 (Utah 1984) (holding that
the state statute defining the offense of statutory rape requires the government
to prove that the defendant was negligent with respect to the victim‘s age).
185. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 4.3 at 262; see also MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.02(2)(c), (d) (1985) (defining recklessness and negligence standards to
encompass conduct that poses unjustifiable risk either ―that the material
element exists‖ or that the material element ―will result from [the] conduct‖).
186. 547 U.S. 90 (2006).
187. Id. at 94-95 (quoting 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.7(c), at
398 (4th ed. 2004)).
188. Id. at 95-96.
189. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt., at 125 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955)
(―Whether the risk relates to the nature of the actor‘s conduct or to the existence
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ignorance; they arise from limitations on the available
information.190 What distinguishes our two situations is just
the source of the ignorance from which the probability
arises. In the one case, the ignorance is a product of the fact
that the event still lies in the future; in the other, of the fact
that some existing condition is hidden from view. The basic
question, though, is the same. To a person trying to
calculate the probability that a coin will be found lying
―heads‖ up, the task is the same whether the coin is about to
be tossed or has already been tossed and is hidden from
view.191
III. HOW THE FORMULA WORKS, PART 2: DEFINING THE
CIRCUMSTANCES TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT
In the last Section, I identified a method for deriving
probabilities from bodies of facts or evidence. The question
remains, though: ―[W]hat conditions are to be taken into
account in making the probability judgments‖?192 The
known-circumstances formula provides a clear answer to
this question, of course: the ―conditions to be taken into
account‖ are just the facts the actor knew. The real question
for this Section is whether this method of defining the
factual setup is vulnerable to the objections that critics of
objective probability have raised in relation to another
method of defining the body of facts or evidence: namely, the
reasonable-person-centered method. In this Section, I will
identify the concern underlying these objections as a
concern about artificiality and arbitrariness, and I will
of the requisite attendant circumstances or to the result that may ensue is
immaterial; the concept is the same.‖).
190. GILLIES, supra note 162, at 17 (―In a completely deterministic system,
probabilities cannot be inherent in objective nature but must be relative to
human ignorance.‖); GREENE, supra note 15, at 105 (―We are accustomed to
probability showing up in horse races, in coin tosses, and at the roulette table,
but in those cases, it mere reflects our incomplete knowledge.‖).
191. Cf. Helen Beebee & David Papineau, Probability as a Guide to Life, 94 J.
PHIL. 217, 224 (1997) (arguing that in formulating a method of calculating
objective probabilities, it doesn‘t matter whether the subject is the probability of
events that remain in the future or is the probability of already existing facts).
192. Wechsler & Michael, supra note 1, at 747.
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argue that the known-circumstances formula is not
vulnerable to this concern.
A. The Problem of Artificiality
If one overlooks, as nearly everyone has, the alternative
of measuring the probabilities on the basis of the known
circumstances, then there really appear to be just two
possible answers to the question ―what conditions are to be
taken into account in making the probability judgments?‖193
The first answer is simply to ―take the actor at the time of
the [action], with what he is conscious of and adverting to,
his background beliefs, and so forth.‖194 In other words, the
first answer is to calculate the probabilities on the basis of
what the actor herself believed the facts to be. The second
answer is to ―construct an artificial perspective‖195 using
―some beliefs of the actual actor together with beliefs that
the [fact-finder] inserts.‖196 Scholars have argued—correctly,
I think—that neither of these two alternatives is workable,
at least as a method of deriving objective probabilities.197
And from the failure of these two alternatives, some have
drawn the further conclusion that the idea of objective
probability is incoherent.198
The scholars appear to be right about the impossibility
of deriving objective probabilities from a factual setup
193. Id.
194. ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 11, at 83.
195. Id. at 29.
196. Id. at 82 (emphasis added).
197. See id. at 85 (―[T]here is no principled way to determine the composition
of [the reasonable-person] construct.‖); Seavey, supra note 57, at 6-7, 18
(arguing that probabilities calculated without falsely ascribing ―further
knowledge‖ to the actor are ―purely subjective,‖ but that the false ascription of
further knowledge to the actor is impermissible). For a discussion disavowing
the view, ascribed to them by me, that ―the relevant probabilities must be
derived by the fact-finder from a body of information consisting of all the facts
as the actor believed them to be,‖ Johnson, supra note 32, at 421, see Larry
Alexander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Response to Critics, 29 L. & PHIL. 482,
492-93 (2010).
198. See ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 11, at 31 (―[O]bjective risk . . . is either
illusory . . . or arbitrary . . . .‖).
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defined merely by what the actor herself believed the facts
to be.199 The central problem with this method of defining
the factual setup is that individuals often hold beliefs that
are inconsistent with one another.200 Suppose, for example,
that a driver tries to pass another car on a blind curve and,
as a result, winds up colliding with an oncoming car. The
driver might insist afterwards that she thought the chances
were remote that she would encounter another car on the
curve. At the same time, though, she might admit knowing
that during her daily ten-minute commute on this roadway,
she usually sees about twenty cars traveling in the other
direction. And she might admit knowing that, in order to
pass, she would have to spend at least, say, twenty seconds
in the other lane. In cases like this, what is the jury to
credit in calculating the probability of harm? Should it
credit the actor‘s background beliefs? Or should it credit her
estimate of the risk, which is plainly inconsistent with her
background beliefs? It cannot do both, and it therefore
cannot really calculate the probabilities on the basis of all
the beliefs that the actor actually held.201
The scholars also appear to be right in their second,
more interesting claim: that the factual setup for the
probability calculation cannot be defined by what a
―reasonable person,‖ a standard man, or an ―idealized
observer‖ would have believed under the circumstances.202 If
199. See Seavey, supra note 57, at 6-7 (arguing that adoption of actor‘s
perspective necessarily makes the risk ―purely subjective‖); see also Alexander &
Ferzan, supra note 197, at 492-93.
200. John Banville, A Century of Looking the Other Way, N.Y. TIMES, May 23,
2009, at A21 (―Human beings—human beings everywhere, not just in Ireland—
have a remarkable ability to entertain simultaneously any number of
contradictory propositions.‖).
201. For the proponents of the subjective approach to probability, the answer
to this problem is straightforward: the jury must credit the actor‘s subjective
probability estimate as to the proscribed outcome and ignore the beliefs or
perceptions that lie behind it. See ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 11, at 63
(arguing that what matters is just the actor‘s subjective beliefs about the
probabilities of ―outcomes‖) (emphasis added); WILLIAMS, supra note 1, § 26, at
62-63 (arguing that in recklessness cases, what matters is ―what degree of
possibility [the actor] foresaw‖).
202. Westen, supra note 11, at 544-46.
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the question what a standard man knows about, say, the
toxicity of kerosene is a sociological one, then it probably
can be answered—perhaps by means of a survey. But this
answer doesn‘t appear to have any bearing on the broader
question in whose service the probabilities are being
calculated, namely, whether the actor‘s conduct was
wrong.203 If, on the other hand, the question what a
standard person knows about kerosene is a normative one,
then the question appears to be unanswerable. After all,
―everyone has varying experiences.‖204 And so there is,
finally, ―no standard of knowledge as to the existence of
physical facts surrounding any situation.‖205
This is not to deny, of course, that the reasonableperson construct has a legitimate role to play in the
criminal law. It might. In recklessness and criminal
negligence cases, for example, the reasonable person might
have a role to play in the jury‘s resolution of the broader,
partly normative question in which the probability inquiry
is embedded, namely, whether the risk posed by the actor‘s
conduct was unjustifiable.206 The reasonable-personconstruct might also have a legitimate role to play in the
jury‘s resolution of the separate question—in recklessness
and criminal negligence cases—whether the actor‘s conduct

203. See HOLMES, supra note 39, at 55 (―So far . . . as criminal liability is
founded upon wrong-doing in any sense, . . . [it] must be confined to cases where
circumstances making the conduct dangerous were known [to the actor].‖);
Westen, supra note 11, at 546 (―There is no justification for making an actor‘s
criminal responsibility depend upon whether an average or ‗normal‘ person
would have made the same mistake.‖).
204. Seavey, supra note 57, at 18.
205. Id.; see also ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 11, at 82-83 (―The [reasonable
person] standard, cut loose from the alternative moorings of the actor‘s actual
beliefs or the world as it really was at the time the actor acted, is completely
adrift in a sea of alternative constructions, none of which is more compelling
than others.‖); Westen, supra note 18, at 139 (summarizing difficulties
associated with imputing individual characteristics to reasonable person).
206. See Westen, supra note 18, at 141-42, 144 (describing the role of the
reasonable person in defining objective ―standards of conduct‖ and making a
distinction between the reasonable person‘s role as ―a measure of conduct‖ and
its role as ―a measure of . . . culpability‖).
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was culpable.207 In both these settings, though, the
reasonable person plays a role fundamentally different from
her role in the reasonable-person-centered method of
deriving probabilities. In both these other settings, the
reasonable person functions as ―a normative measure of
what kinds of conduct, thinking, and emotions are
normatively appropriate to such facts as obtain or are
believed to obtain.‖208 A reasonable-person-centered theory
of probability, in contrast, would rely on the reasonable
person in generating the underlying facts and beliefs
themselves, from the ground up.209 In this role, as Larry
Alexander has said, the reasonable-person construct is
―indeterminate through and through. Its application will
perforce be completely arbitrary and manipulable.‖210
B. The Known-Circumstances Formula Isn’t Artificial
So the theorists are right in concluding both that (1) the
probabilities of interest to the criminal law cannot be
derived from a factual setup defined merely by what the
actor herself believed the facts to be; and (2) the
probabilities of interest to the criminal law cannot be
derived from a factual setup defined by what a reasonable
person would have believed under the circumstances. Where
the theorists go wrong, of course, is in drawing the further
conclusion—based on the failure of these two alternatives—
that objective probability is illusory.211 The theorists have
207. See George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 537, 557 n.74 (1972) (arguing that the Model Penal Code‘s definition of
negligence ―invoke[es] the reasonable man only to account for the
blameworthiness of the negligent conduct‖); Westen, supra note 18, at 142-43.
208. Westen, supra note 11, at 545-46; see also Westen, supra note 18, at 138 (
―[R]easonableness is a normative measure of ways in which it is right for
persons to think, feel or behave—or, at the very least, ways in which it is not
wrong for them to do so‖).
209. See DUFF, supra note 17, at 82 (―[The] ‗reasonable‘ observer will know
certain general facts about the world in which she and the defendant live . . . .‖);
Crocker, supra note 19, at 1099 (assigning idealized observer the role of defining
―the ‗conditions of repetition‘ under which the probability is to be generated‖).
210. Alexander, supra note 20, at 67.
211. ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 11, at 31.
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overlooked a viable third alternative: namely, using the
circumstances known to the actor to define the set of
conditions to be taken into account.
This alternative approach to defining the factual setup
is not, moreover, vulnerable to either of the two concerns
that led to the failure of the other approaches. First, the
known-circumstances formula is not vulnerable to concerns
about consistency. What the actor knows is, by definition,
true; and no truth is inconsistent with any other.212 Second,
the known-circumstances formula‘s method of defining the
factual setup from which the probabilities are derived—as
distinguished from its method of deriving probabilities from
this setup (about which more in a moment213)—is not
vulnerable to concerns about artificiality.
The artificiality objection to the reasonable-personcentered approach began with the assumption that what is
natural or unconstructed is the actor‘s entire mental field—
―all the beliefs that the actor actually held,‖ in other
words.214 This view, though, overlooks the possibility of
defining somewhat differently what is natural in the actor‘s
perspective. A perspective defined by what the actor knows
of the facts is no more artificial than a perspective defined
by what she believes. The word ―perspective‖ sometimes is
used to refer to a person‘s entire visual or mental field.215
But it sometimes is used instead to define the relationship
between a viewer and a viewed object.216 As philosopher
Simon Blackburn has said, the notion of perspective
conceives of sight as ―a transaction between a thing in one
212. Rubin Gotesky, The Uses of Inconsistency, 28 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RES. 471, 471 (1968) (summarizing Aristotle‘s and Parmenides‘s view that the
world is so constructed that a contradiction cannot occur).
213. See infra text accompanying notes 220-44.
214. ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 11, at 82.
215. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER‘S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 988 (2000) [hereinafter
COLLEGE DICTIONARY] (―[Perspective is] ―(i) a visual scene, esp. one extending to
a distance‖; (ii) ―one‘s mental view of facts, ideas, etc., and their
interrelationships‖; and (iii) ―a mental view or prospect.‖).
216. Id. (―[Perspective is] the manner in which objects appear to the eye in
respect to their relative positions and distance.‖); see also SIMON BLACKBURN,
TRUTH: A GUIDE 87 (2005) (―Perspective is a notion from the science of sight.‖).
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place in space, and another thing, a perceiver, at a different
place in space.‖217
This use of the word ―perspective‖ to refer just to what
the actor knows is in keeping with this second definition of
the word. Imagine describing a person‘s visual perspective
on, say, a particular building. And imagine that the person‘s
view of the building is partly blocked by a billboard. Our
description of the person‘s perspective on the building—of
how the building looks from her perspective—would not
include a description of the contents of the billboard.
Granted, neither would it include a description of the
portion of the building that is obscured by the billboard. Her
perspective on the building—as we describe it—would be
partial, as all perspectives are, but it would include nothing
that is not part of the building. It would not encompass the
viewer‘s entire visual field.
The actor‘s mental ―perspective‖ on the world can be
thought of in the same terms. So conceived, our description
of the actor‘s perspective on the world—of how the world
appears to her—would not include a description of what
obscures her perception of the world, or of the truth. Her
perspective on the world would be partial, as all
perspectives are.218 But our description of her perspective on
the world would include nothing that is not true. It would
not encompass her entire ―mental view or prospect.‖219
Rather, it would include only what she knows of the world.
C. The Problem of Common Experience
There is one respect in which the known-circumstances
approach—at least as formulated by Holmes and
Wechsler—is vulnerable to the very criticism that undercuts
217. BLACKBURN, supra note 216, at 87.
218. Cf. Gottlob Frege, On Sense and Meaning, 100 ZEITSCHRIFT FϋR
PHILOSOPHIE UND PHILOSOPHISCHE KRITIK 25 (1882), reprinted in TRANSLATIONS
FROM THE PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF GOTTLOB FREGE 65 (Peter Geach & Max
Black eds. & trans. 1980) (describing judgments as ―distinctions of parts within
truth values‖ and acknowledging the confusion that arises from the fact that
―the word ‗part‘ is already used of bodies in another sense‖).
219. COLLEGE DICTIONARY, supra note 215, at 991.
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the reasonable-person-centered approach. Though Holmes
said that the probability of harm is judged in relation to
―the circumstances known to the actor,‖ he also said that
the trier of fact must rely on ―common experience‖ in
deriving this probability from the known circumstances.220
According to Holmes, the test of criminality is ―the degree of
danger which common experience shows to attend the act
under the circumstances known to the actor.‖221 Wechsler
and Michael, too, assigned a role to ―common experience.‖222
The idea behind the known-circumstances formula, they
said, is that ―[o]n the basis of common experience, one may
attempt to estimate the probability that [the proscribed
harm] would result from the act, taking into account only
the circumstances known to the actor.‖223
This resort to common experience is problematic. What
makes Holmes‘s and Wechsler‘s resort to common
experience at first seem unobjectionable is that they use
common experience not in defining the set of ―conditions . . .
to be taken into account in making the probability
judgments,‖224 but rather in specifying the method by which
the factfinder will derive probabilities from this set of
conditions. For purposes of the artificiality concern,
however, it doesn‘t appear to matter at what stage the
artificial infusion of knowledge occurs. Nor does it appear to
matter whether this infusion of knowledge is limited to deep
background facts of a kind known to nearly every member of
220. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 178 (1883).
221. Id. (emphasis added).
222. Wechsler & Michael, supra note 1, at 735.
223. Id. (emphasis added). The search and seizure cases, likewise, appear to
assume that common experience will be used in deriving probabilities from the
circumstances known to the actor. See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S.
690, 696 (1996) (―[P]robable cause to search [exists] where the known facts and
circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the
belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.‖); Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (―Probable cause exists where ‗the facts and
circumstances with their (the officers‘) knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief that‘ an offense has been or is being
committed.‖ (quoting United States v. Carroll, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925))).
224. Wechsler & Michael, supra note 1, at 747.
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the community.225 In either event, as Holmes acknowledged,
the result is to hold the actor responsible for knowledge she
might not have.226 And so in either event, the effect is to
sever the connection between probability and wrongdoing.
Just as ―[t]here is no standard of knowledge of isolated
events,‖ there also ―should be no standard of knowledge
based upon a common community experience.‖227
The answer to this problem is not as easy as jettisoning
the common-experience component entirely, however. As
Holmes and Wechsler apparently recognized, it is difficult
to make the probability calculation work without an
infusion of common experience. Evidential probabilities—of
the kind at work in criminal law, the law of search and
seizure, and the law of evidence—cannot be obtained merely
through the application of formal logic to a small body of
case-specific facts or circumstances.228 Consider, for
example, how a judge goes about deciding—as judges often
225. See Seavey, supra note 57, at 18-19 (―[A] hermit hearing, without
explanation, a radio for the first time; or a savage, suddenly dropped from his
native swamps into the streets of New York, cannot be judged except with
reference to what he knows.‖).
226. Pierce, 138 Mass. at 179-80 (―[I]f the dangers are characteristic of the
class according to common experience, then he who uses an article of the class
upon another cannot escape on the ground that he had less than the common
experience.‖); HOLMES, supra note 39, at 57 (―[T]he law requires [people] at their
peril to know the teachings of common experience, just as it requires them to
know the law.‖).
227. Seavey, supra note 56, at 18-19.
228. See RONALD ALLEN ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, AND CASES 113-14
(4th ed. 2006) (―[W]hat seems ‗plausible‘ to a person is determined by the sum of
that person‘s knowledge and experience rather than by the outcome of formal
logical manipulations.‖); JAMES B. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE
AT THE COMMON LAW 279-80 (1898) (―In conducting a process of judicial
reasoning, as of other reasoning, not a step can be taken without assuming
something which has not been proved; and the capacity to do this, with
competent judgment and efficiency, is imputed to judges and juries as part of
their necessary mental outfit.‖); GILLIES, supra note 162, at 25-49 (describing
the shortcomings of logical theories of probability, which purport to derive
probabilities merely by the application of formal logic to defined sets of
conditions); cf. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (―Long before
the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated
certain common-sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as factfinders
are permitted to do the same—and so are law enforcement officers.‖).
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must under the evidence rules—whether a particular piece
of evidence makes a fact of legal consequence ―more
probable or less probable‖ than it would be without the
evidence.229 And consider how a jury decides what
probabilities to assign to case-specific historical facts on the
basis of the evidence adduced at trial.230 In these settings,
the judge and jury can make the required probability
judgments only with the help of ―vast storehouses of
commonly-held notions about how people and objects
generally behave in our society.‖231
So the problem, finally, is how to reconcile (1) the
apparent dependence of the probability calculation on
access to vast storehouses of background knowledge; and (2)
the practical impossibility of specifying exhaustively the
contents of the actor‘s own vast storehouse of background
knowledge. The solution to this problem is, I think, to
reinterpret Holmes‘s and Wechsler‘s references to ―common
experience‖ as creating a kind of rebuttable presumption
that the actor knew of the background facts just what other
members of the community know. Warren Seavey hinted at
this solution in a 1927 law review article.232 Seavey
acknowledged, albeit in relation to the tort of negligence,
that ―there should be no standard of knowledge based upon
a common community experience,‖ and that, accordingly,
even ―a savage suddenly dropped from his native swamps
into the streets of New York[] cannot be judged except with
229. FED. R. EVID. 401; see also id. advisory committee‘s note (―[Probability]
depends upon principles evolved by experience or science, applied logically to
the situation at hand.‖).
230. See State v. Manning, 224 N.W.2d 232, 236 (Iowa 1974) (explaining that
juries rely on ―reason and . . . those experiences which are common to men
generally‖ in deciding what inferences to draw from the evidence adduced at
trial (quoting Purcell v. Tibbles, 69 N.W. 1120, 1121 (Iowa 1897))); see also
Rostad v. Portland Ry., Light & Power Co., 201 P. 184, 187 (Or. 1921) (―[A]ny
juror must consider the testimony in light of that knowledge and experience
which is common to all men.‖).
231. DAVID A. BINDER & PAUL BERGMAN, FACT INVESTIGATION 85 (1984); see also
FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee‘s note (acknowledging that neither jury
nor judge could decide what inferences to draw from evidence without resort to
―hundreds or thousands‖ of other facts).
232. Seavey, supra note 57, at 18-19.
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reference to what he knows.‖233 But Seavey nevertheless
found a role for ―common experience‖ in the measurement of
probability: ―[T]here is an inference that all persons in the
community have had a common experience and because of
this know certain matters of ‗common knowledge,‘ this
inference being often sufficient to create a presumption
against a defendant.‖234
This means that the jury in Commonwealth v. Pierce,
for example, would have been justified in assuming, even
without specific evidence, that Pierce knew of kerosene
what other members of his community did. And it means
that the jury in People v. Knoller probably would have been
justified in assuming that Knoller knew of dog behavior
what other members of her community knew.235 At the same
time, though, Seavey‘s approach would have permitted
either Pierce or Knoller to challenge this assumption—to
show, in Seavey‘s formulation, that either was a ―savage‖ or
a ―hermit‖ who lacked this common experience.236 In effect,
Seavey‘s approach creates a movable line between the
known-circumstances component of the Holmes test and the
common-experience component. The parties decide what
aspects of the actor‘s knowledge they want to litigate; as to
the rest, the jury defaults to common experience. What
ultimately matters, however, is just what the actor knew.
This resort to a movable line between knowledge and
experience is less makeshift than it appears. Just this sort
of movable line probably is an inevitable feature of any
system for deriving probabilities from defined bodies of
evidence or facts.237 In the United States jury trial system,
233. Id.
234. Id. at 19.
235. See id. at 19 n.18 (describing Linnehan v. Sampson, 126 Mass. 506 (1878),
where the court held in a civil action for injuries by a bull that the defendant
could be liable only if he knew of the bull‘s propensities, but that the jury might
find, without specific evidence, that the defendant knew what was common
knowledge in the neighborhood).
236. See Seavey, supra note 57, at 19.
237. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee‘s note (explaining that neither
the judge nor the jury could decide what inferences to draw from the evidence
adduced at trial without making use of ―hundreds or thousands‖ of other facts);
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for example, juries routinely are instructed that ―you must
decide the case solely on the evidence before you,‖238 and
that ―[a]ny inference you make . . . must be based on the
evidence in the case.‖239 At the same time, though,
everybody acknowledges that the jury could not possibly
decide what inferences to draw from the evidence—and,
finally, what probabilities to assign to the case-specific
historical facts at issue—without drawing on ―knowledge
gained from the experiences common to men generally.‖240
The jury, it is often said, considers the evidence ―in the light
of reason and of those experiences which are common to
men generally.‖241
This line between the ―evidence‖ and the jury‘s
―common experience‖ is movable, moreover. In the ordinary
case, the jury will hear no evidence about, say, the effects of
the passage of time on witnesses‘ memories. This topic is
―within the ken of jurors‖242 and so the jury ordinarily draws
only on common experience in judging the effects of time on
a particular witness‘s testimony. This doesn‘t mean, though,
that this topic falls on one side of a fixed line dividing topics
suitable for the introduction of evidence, on the one hand,
from topics within the common experience of jurors, on the
GILLIES, supra note 155, at 162 (explaining that intersubjective probabilities are
conditional or relational, but that the conditions necessarily include background
knowledge from which the probabilities are judged).
238. MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS
3.1 (2003).

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT §

239. FEDERAL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 1.11 (2010).
240. State v. Manning, 224 N.W.2d 232, 236 (Iowa 1974) (quoting Purcell v.
Tibbles, 69 N.W. 1120, 1121 (Iowa 1897)); see also, e.g., Wassilie v. Alaska Vill.
Elec. Coop., 816 P.2d 158, 162 n.6 (Alaska 1991) (―[I]t is possible that the jury
applied its knowledge of local conditions to conclude that an accident was
foreseeable.‖); Linn v. State, 133 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003) (holding
that ―[a] jury may also rely on its common knowledge, experiences, and
observations in life‖ in deciding whether the evidence at trial is sufficient to
prove that the victim suffered a physical injury); ALLEN ET AL., supra note 228,
113-14 (―[W]hat seems ‗plausible‘ to a person is determined by the sum of that
person‘s knowledge and experience rather than by the outcome of formal logical
manipulations.‖).
241. Manning, 224 N.W.2d at 236.
242. Bomas v. State, 987 A.2d 98, 115 (Md. 2010).
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other. Expert testimony about the effects of the passage of
time on witnesses‘ memories—or about any other topic
within the ken of the lay juror—is admissible if it adds
something to, or subtracts something from, the jury‘s
storehouse of common experience.243 It is admissible if, for
example, it describes ―scientific advances . . . [that have led
to a] greater understanding of the mechanics of memory
that may not be intuitive to a layperson.‖244 In effect, then,
the litigants decide what they want to challenge of the jury‘s
storehouse of common experience, and so they decide where
the line between the evidence and the jury‘s common
experience is located.
IV. WHY THE PROBABILITIES GENERATED BY THE KNOWNCIRCUMSTANCES APPROACH ARE AN APT MEASURE OF
WRONGDOING
What the preceding two Sections show, at best, is that
probabilities derived using the known-circumstances
formula are neither ―illusory‖ nor ―artificial.‖ The real
question remains, though: Are these the probabilities on
which the justifiability, and legality, of the actor‘s conduct
ought to depend? Do these probabilities represent the
actor‘s perspective authentically in a way that, say, her own
estimate of the probabilities does not?
My answer to this question will take the form of
responses to a series of objections, most of which take issue
with what the known-circumstance formula leaves out of the
probability calculation. No one, presumably, would quarrel
with what the known-circumstances formula includes; no
one, that is, would quarrel with the inclusion of what the
actor knows in the body of facts or evidence from which the
probabilities are derived. What seems objectionable about
the formula is, rather, what it leaves out. It leaves out, for
example, the actor‘s probability estimates and partial
243. See KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 206, at 881-83
(6th ed. 2006) (―[I]n those instances where the case turns on the eyewitness
testimony and the expert‘s assistance could make a difference, the scientific
knowledge generally should be admitted.‖).
244. Bomas, 987 A.2d at 112.
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beliefs, which cannot count as ―known circumstances‖ even
if they are accurate. And it leaves out any of the actor‘s
beliefs that turned out to be false, even if the actor had very
good reasons for believing as she did. Finally, it leaves out
what the actor should have believed but did not.
All of these objections have the same answer. All of
these things that seem, intuitively, to matter—the actor‘s
probability estimates, her justified beliefs, and what she
should have believed but didn‘t—really only matter to the
degree that they are connected to what the actor knows.
And to the degree that they are connected to what the actor
knows, they are mostly redundant of the known
circumstances. The actor‘s perspective is, finally, less like a
jigsaw puzzle than a densely woven tapestry. The absence of
a few threads from the fabric of the actor‘s experience does
not distort the picture conveyed.
A. The Richness of What the Actor Knows
Perhaps the most fundamental objection to the knowncircumstances formula is that, in the ordinary case, the
known circumstances are too few and too sparse to generate
probabilities; ―knowing is hard,‖ after all.245 This objection is
nicely framed by Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler
Ferzan, who use a standard example: ―David believes that
he is going 80 miles per hour, but his speedometer is broken
and he is actually going 50 mph.‖246 They argue that the
known-circumstances formula does not provide enough data
to enable us to calculate the probability of harm faced by
David, whatever that probability might be. Alexander and
Ferzan argue: ―If we look at what David ‗knows‘, then he
doesn‘t know the speed he is traveling. He has a false belief.
How are we to glean the probability of harm based on
David‘s knowledge?‖247
245. Fred I. Dretske, The Epistemology of Belief, 55 SYNTHESE 3, 3 (1983)
(―Believing is easy, knowing is hard . . . . Such is the conventional contrast
between knowledge and belief.‖).
246. Alexander & Ferzan, supra note 197, at 493; see also Robinson, supra
note 10, at 388 (analyzing a similar broken-speedometer example).
247. Alexander & Ferzan, supra note 197, at 493.
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Though Alexander and Ferzan have identified one thing
David does not know—namely, the speed at which he is
traveling—they have overlooked countless other facts that
he does know. For one, David knows that his speedometer
reads eighty miles per hour. The reading on the
speedometer is, of course, false. Still, this reading is among
the circumstances known to David. And so this reading—
together with David‘s background knowledge that cars‘
speedometers usually are roughly accurate—is one of the
facts that will drive the probability calculation.248 It
suggests that he is driving eighty miles per hour, and
thereby suggests that the probability of harm to the
occupants of other cars, and perhaps to pedestrians too, is
high.
There is much more, though. For example, David
probably knows the posted speed limit on the highway
where he is driving, and he probably has noticed how fast
he is driving in relation to the other drivers. If the speed
limit is, say, fifty miles per hour, and he knows that he is
being passed by more cars than he is passing, then these
two known facts—together with David‘s deep background
knowledge that United States drivers usually drive within
ten miles per hour or so of the posted speed limit—suggest
that David is not really driving 80 miles per hour. David
might also know other things that cast doubt on the
speedometer reading. He might know, for example, that his
speedometer has malfunctioned in the past. Even if he has
not drawn the natural inference from this knowledge—
namely, that his speedometer‘s current reading is wrong—
the speedometer‘s past malfunctioning still is a known
circumstance that, under our formula, affects the
probability calculation.
Probably the most important aspect of David‘s
knowledge, however, is not his knowledge of truths but,
248. In the search and seizure cases, by comparison, an informant‘s report
might well provide probable cause even if it turns out to be false, since the fact
that the informant made the report is among the facts that the officer knows.
See Carter v. United States, 244 A.2d 483, 485 (D.C. 1968) (relying in part on
the informant‘s false report of a robbery in concluding that the ―probabilities‖
were sufficient to justify defendant‘s arrest).
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rather, his knowledge by acquaintance. This terminology—
knowledge of truths, knowledge by acquaintance—is
Bertrand Russell‘s,249 but the underlying distinction
between two uses of the word ―know‖ is commonsensical.250
As Russell explained, the first use of the word ―know‖ is
―applicable to the sort of knowledge which is opposed to
error . . . the sense which applies to our beliefs and
convictions.‖251 The second use of the word ―know‖ ―applies
to our knowledge of things, which we may call
acquaintance.‖252 This second sense is the sense in which we
―know,‖ say, a particular shade of brown. We might
formulate any number of ―truths‖ about the color—―that it
is brown, that it is dark, and so on.‖253 But we also possess
an immediate sensory knowledge of the color that is not
remotely exhausted by these truths. This is knowledge by
acquaintance.
Knowledge by acquaintance often plays an important
role in the jury‘s probability calculations in criminal cases.254
249. BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 69 (1912). Some of
what Russell says about ―knowledge by acquaintance‖ is controversial. See, e.g.,
H.L.A. Hart et al., Is There Knowledge by Acquaintance?, 23 ARISTOTELIAN SOC‘Y
SUPPLEMENTARY 69 (1949); G. Dawes Hicks et al., Is There Knowledge by
Acquaintance?, 2 ARISTOTELIAN SOC‘Y SUPPLEMENTARY 159, 179 (1919). But what
matters for my argument is simply that (1) there is a kind of knowledge that we
can ascribe to an actor without, at the same time, ascribing any particular
beliefs to him; and (2) that this knowledge has a legitimate role to play in
calculating the objective probabilities.
250. G. E. Moore observed that Russell uses the phrase ―knowledge by
acquaintance‖ primarily ―to express a fact, which we all know to be a fact, and
which no one wishes to dispute.‖ See Hicks, supra note 249, at 179.
251. RUSSELL, supra note 249, at 69.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 73.
254. Knowledge by acquaintance plays much the same role in the law of search
and seizure. Consider State v. Campbell, 198 P.3d 1170, 1173 (Alaska Ct. App.
2008), where the constitutionality of a traffic stop was at issue. A police officer
stopped Campbell‘s car in the mistaken belief that the car was operating in
violation of a state regulation that required vehicles to have their headlights on
one half-hour after sunset. Id. The officer had contacted a police dispatcher at
about 11:00 p.m. to find out ―what time sunset was‖ and the dispatcher had told
him that sunset was ―somewhere around‖ 10:26 p.m. Id. As a result, when the
officer stopped Campbell‘s car at 11:20 p.m., the officer believed that the sun
had set nearly an hour before. See id. In fact, though, the sun did not set that
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Consider, for example, a case of child sexual abuse in which
the defendant asserts, as a defense, that he made a
reasonable mistake about the girl‘s age. In calculating the
objective probability that the girl had reached the critical
age, the jury might rely in part on the defendant‘s
―knowledge of truths.‖ It might rely, for example, on the fact
that the defendant had seen a sixth-grade report card on
the girl‘s dresser. And it might rely on what the girl had
said to the defendant about her age. But the jury also will
rely on what the defendant knew by acquaintance of the
girl‘s appearance. The girl will take the witness stand and
the jury will decide for itself how old she must have
appeared to the defendant at the time of the alleged abuse.
What the jury learns of the girl‘s appearance—and what
knowledge the jury ascribes to the defendant as a result—
will not take the form of descriptive ―truths‖ about the girl‘s
appearance. Rather, the jury‘s reckoning of the objective
probability that she had reached the critical age will be
influenced by what the jurors notice intuitively about, say,
the size of her eyes relative to the size of her nose.255
Much the same thing would be true in the broken
speedometer case. Human beings are pretty good at judging
speed without the help of speedometers,256 and they also are
night until 11:25 p.m. Id. In resolving the question whether the officer had
probable cause to stop Campbell, the appeals court relied in part on the officer‘s
knowledge of truths—for example, his knowledge that the dispatcher had told
him that sunset was around 10:26 p.m. See id. But the court also took into
account what the officer knew by acquaintance. The court observed that ―the
sun was above the horizon for almost half an hour after Officer Chafin spoke to
his dispatcher‖ and that, according to the officer himself, ―the evening of June
4th was a ‗very nice‘ evening.‖ Id. No doubt these two observations were meant
in part to negate any possibility that the officer had actually gone to the trouble
of checking the horizon for the sun. But they were also meant, I think, to
conjure up for the reader a sense of how the ambient light must have appeared
to the officer.
255. ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND
EVERYDAY LIFE 65 (1994) (noting that a woman‘s eyes look smaller and her nose
appears larger as she gets older).
256. See Marcucci v. Bird, 88 N.Y.S.2d 333, 335 (App. Div. 1949) (―An estimate
of the speed at which an automobile is moving at a given time is generally
viewed as a matter of common observation rather than expert opinion, and it is
well settled that any person of ordinary ability and intelligence having the
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pretty good at judging (again without the help of
speedometers) the risks associated with particular speeds
under particular conditions.257 If, as stipulated by Alexander
and Ferzan, David really was driving fifty miles per hour,
then the jury, in evaluating the probability of harm under
the known circumstances, will consider how the world
appears to a person who is driving fifty miles per hour. And
this consideration, like the jury‘s consideration of the girl‘s
appearance in the sexual abuse case, will affect the jury‘s
calculation of the probability of harm.
In summary, what the actor knows of the circumstances
is rich enough to generate probabilities. What the actor
knows encompasses facts that have obvious bearing on the
probability of harm—like a speedometer reading. But what
the actor knows also encompasses a variety of concrete
circumstances in the immediate background—like the fact
that other drivers are passing him. And it encompasses a
multitude of facts in the deep background—like the fact that
most people drive within ten miles per hour or so of the
speed limit. Finally, it encompasses what the actor knows
by acquaintance.
B. Imputed Knowledge or Foresight
Another potential objection to the known-circumstances
approach is that it assigns no weight in the probability
calculation to what the actor should have known but did
not. In some cases, the actor will be able plausibly to deny
knowledge of a fact that seems critical to the probability
setup. In the Pierce case, for example, Dr. Pierce plausibly
denied having known that kerosene was poisonous when
used as a balm.258 And in Wilson v. Tard, where defendant
Wilson was convicted of manslaughter after accidentally
means or opportunity of observation is competent to testify as to the rate of
speed of such a vehicle.‖).
257. See Robert E. King & Cass R. Sunstein, Doing Without Speed Limits, 79
B.U. L. REV. 155, 163 (1999) (explaining why Montanans‘ driving habits were
not dramatically affected by the adoption of federally mandated speed limits,
and recounting one resident‘s observation that Montanans know the safe speed
for travelling a particular road).
258. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 174 (1884).
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shooting a friend, the defendant plausibly denied having
known that the gun was loaded.259 If these denials are
credited, neither of these seemingly critical facts—the
toxicity of kerosene, in Pierce, and the bullet in the gun, in
Wilson—will count as a ―known circumstance.‖ And so
neither of these facts will play a role in the generation of the
relevant probabilities. What these examples appear to show
is that any adequate formula for calculating probabilities
must assign weight not only to what the actor knew but, in
addition, to what the actor should have known.
This appearance is deceiving. As a preliminary matter,
notice that the phrase ―should have known‖ might mean
either of two things. First, it might mean that the actor
should have inferred the existence of the critical fact from
what the actor already knew.260 Second, it might mean
instead that the actor should have discovered the critical
fact by conducting additional investigation or acquiring
additional experience.261 The objection described above
really encompasses two questions, then: (1) Is it a
shortcoming of the known-circumstances approach that it
does not permit the jury to impute inferential knowledge to
the defendant?; and (2) Is it a shortcoming of the knowncircumstances approach that it does not permit the finder of
fact to impute non-inferential knowledge to the actor?
As to the first question, Holmes and Wechsler both
appear sometimes to have assumed that the factfinder
would be required, as an intermediate step in the
calculation of the probabilities, to decide what a reasonable
person would have inferred from the facts that the actor
actually knew.262 Holmes said, for example, that the
259. Wilson v. Tard, 593 F. Supp. 1091, 1093 (D.N.J. 1984) (granting habeas
relief).
260. ―Two questions are involved‖ in the broader question ―what a man of
reasonable prudence would discover,‖ namely, ―(1) What knowledge would most
men acquire from a given kind of investigation?‖ and ―(2) What sort of
investigation, if any, would a reasonably prudent man make?‖ See Wechsler &
Michael, supra note 1, at 748.
261. Id.
262. See HOLMES, supra note 39, at 75; Wechsler & Michael, supra note 1, at
748.
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defendant could be charged with knowledge of ―things which
a reasonable and prudent man would have inferred from the
things actually known.‖263 And Wechsler and Michael said
that the jury was required to decide ―[w]hat knowledge . .
.most men [would] acquire from a given kind of
investigation [or experience].‖264 What Holmes, Wechsler,
and Michael appear to have meant is that the factfinder, in
constructing the factual setup from which the probabilities
are derived, may take into account not only what the actor
knew but also what the actor ought to have known—at least
by way of inferential knowledge.265
But this modification of the known-circumstances
formula doesn‘t accomplish anything. In cases like Pierce
and Wilson, the factual setup for generating the
probabilities already will include the underlying facts on
which the imputed inferential knowledge is based—the
―things actually known,‖ in Holmes‘s formulation.266 Adding
to this factual setup a new ―fact‖ that is nothing more than
a probabilistic inference from other known facts would have
no effect on the jury‘s probability calculation, since the jury
would already have taken into account the probabilistic
import of the other known facts in making the probability
calculation.
Take the Pierce case, for example. If we were to impute
inferential knowledge of kerosene‘s toxicity to Pierce, the
imputation would be based—as Holmes said—on things
actually known to Pierce. The things actually known to
Pierce might have included, for example, the fact that
kerosene is combustible and is used as a fuel and a solvent;
and they might have included, too, the fact that many fuels
and solvents are poisonous when taken internally. To say
that these known facts would have warranted a reasonable
person in inferring that kerosene is potentially toxic,
263. HOLMES, supra note 39, at 75; see also id. at 55 (―An act cannot be wrong,
even when done under circumstances in which it will be hurtful, unless those
circumstances are or ought to be known.‖) (emphasis added).
264. Wechsler & Michael, supra note 1, at 748.
265. HOLMES, supra note 39, at 55.
266. Id. at 75.
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however, is really just to say, as we do in the law of
evidence, that these known facts have a tendency to make
the inferred fact ―more probable . . . than it [otherwise]
would be.‖267 And if these known facts have a tendency to
make the inferred fact more probable, then this very
tendency will make itself felt in the jury‘s probability
calculation anyway.268
In The Common Law, Holmes eventually winds up
making substantially the same point, albeit in connection
with the tort of negligence. In his analysis of the tort of
negligence, as in his analysis of the criminal law, Holmes
concludes that the exclusive ground of liability is ―the
degree of danger attending given conduct under certain
known circumstances.‖269 This basic test, he says, can be
translated into a question about imputed foresight: ―it
would be possible to state all cases of negligence in terms of
imputed or presumed foresight.‖270 Holmes acknowledges,
however, that this translation is nothing more than a mode
of expression or a ―fiction.‖271 What is really going on, at
bottom, is just the derivation of probabilities from the
underlying known facts: ―[I]f foresight were presumed, the
ground of the presumption, and therefore the essential
element, would be the knowledge of facts which made
foresight possible.‖272
At least where inferential knowledge is concerned, then,
it is not a shortcoming of the known-circumstances formula
that it provides no avenue for imputing knowledge to the
267. FED. R. EVID. 401 (―‗Relevant evidence‘ means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.‖); see also LEWIS, supra note 147, at 338 (locating an epistemic
justification in the probabilistic ―congruence‖ among beliefs).
268. Cf. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 178 (1883) (―The truth was,
that [Pierce‘s] failure to predict [the critical facts] was immaterial, if, under the
circumstances known to him, the court or jury, as the case might be, thought
them obvious.‖).
269. HOLMES, supra note 39, at 149.
270. Id. at 147.
271. Id.
272. Id.

568

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

actor. The problem of non-inferential knowledge remains,
however. To illustrate: Suppose that Pierce really knew
almost nothing about the properties of kerosene. On these
facts, one could argue that Pierce‘s real fault lay in failing to
conduct additional investigation of kerosene‘s properties
before using it as a medicinal balm. And one could argue, as
Wechsler and Michael do, that the best and perhaps only
solution to cases like these is to impute to the actor
knowledge he would have acquired if he had conducted ―the
sort of investigation . . .a reasonably prudent man [would]
make‖ under the circumstances.273
Wechsler and Michael get this wrong, though. The
question whether a reasonable person would have
performed additional factual investigation bears not on the
calculation of the probabilities but, rather, on another
aspect of the broader question of justifiability. It bears on
the question whether the availability of an alternative
course of action—namely, pausing long enough to acquire
additional information—made the actor‘s decision to
proceed immediately, without further investigation,
unjustifiable.274 It goes, in other words, not to what a
reasonable person would have believed, but to what a
reasonable person would have done.275 It does not change
the factual setup from which the relevant probabilities are
generated.
Consider our hypothetical variation on Pierce. The
trouble with Wechsler and Michael‘s view is that they
conceive of the choice facing Pierce as embracing just two
alternatives: (1) going forward with the treatment, which
273. The application of the reasonable-person standard in constructing a
factual setup requires the finder of fact to answer the question, ―What sort of
investigation, if any, would a reasonably prudent man make?‖ See Wechsler &
Michael, supra note 1, at 747-48.
274. Id. at 744 (acknowledging that justifiability of conduct depends on the
probability of death or serious injury and on the availability of less dangerous
alternatives that still allow the pursuit of the social benefits that justify the
creation of the risk).
275. See Eric A. Johnson, Beyond Belief: Rethinking the Role of Belief in the
Assessment of Culpability, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 503, 521 (2006) (explaining the
distinction between the reasonableness of action and the reasonableness of a
belief).
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carries, as far as Pierce knows, only a very slight danger;
and (2) ending the treatment, which means sacrificing the
medical benefits obtained by Pierce from kerosene on past
occasions.276 On this view of the situation, Pierce will not be
liable unless the probability of harm is sufficient to
outweigh the supposed benefits of the kerosene treatment.
And so, in order to make the balance come out in favor of
liability, we have to tamper with the probability assigned to
the harm by imputing to Pierce the knowledge that he
would have obtained from a reasonable investigation.277 The
problem disappears, though, if we re-conceive of Pierce‘s
decision as a choice among not two but three alternatives,
including: (3) pausing long enough to consult the medical
books in the local library. Unless Pierce has good reason to
believe that the benefits of the kerosene treatment will be
lost by even a moment‘s distraction, then option three offers
all the benefits of option one with none of the potential
dangers. And because option three offers all the benefits of
option one with none of the dangers, those benefits cannot
be invoked to offset the small but substantial danger
associated with option one.
C. Partial Beliefs
A third possible objection to the known-circumstances
approach is that it assigns no weight to the actor‘s partial
beliefs, or probability estimates. Suppose, for example, that
Mary is driving a critically injured hiking companion to the
hospital when she finds herself trapped behind a slowmoving truck. The two-lane mountain road is winding, so
Mary cannot tell when a car is approaching in the other
direction. In her first five minutes behind the truck, Mary
sees three or four cars go past in the opposite direction.
Based on this and other observations and based on her
experiences on this road, she estimates that her chance of
276. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 169 (1884) (―The defendant
introduced evidence tending to show that he had, prior to [his treatment of
Bemis], made application of kerosene oil to patients for various complaints, with
beneficial results . . . .‖).
277. Wechsler & Michael, supra note 1, at 748.
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encountering an oncoming car while passing the truck is
about .02, or twenty percent.
Mary‘s probability estimate seems to have a strong
bearing on the question whether she should pass the
truck—and on the question whether, if she does pass, her
actions should expose her to criminal liability. But the
known-circumstances formula would assign no weight at all
to Mary‘s probability estimate. Mary could not, after all, be
said to ―know‖ either (1) that a car was approaching or (2)
that a car was not approaching; she was uncertain. Further,
even if we were inclined to count accurate probability
estimates as ―knowledge,‖278 they still would not appear to
qualify as known circumstances for purposes of Holmes‘s
formula.279 And so this seemingly critical fact about Mary‘s
perspective—the likelihood she reasonably assigned to the
prospect of encountering another car—would play no part in
the assessment of whether her actions were justified.
Despite the seeming importance of Mary‘s probability
estimate, it is not a shortcoming of the knowncircumstances formula that it denies estimates like Mary‘s a
role in the jury‘s calculation of the relevant probabilities.
The reason why is suggested in a recent paper by
philosophers John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley.280 The
subject of Hawthorne and Stanley‘s paper is the question of
―what is appropriate to use as a reason for acting.‖281 In
answer to this question, they argue that only knowledge, not
belief, is appropriately invoked as a reason for acting.282 (In
technical terms, their thesis is: ―Knowing that p is
necessary for treating the proposition that p as a reason for
278. See John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley, Knowledge and Action, 105 J.
PHIL. 571, 581 (2008) (suggesting that one way to address their version of the
problem of partial belief is to utilize the knowledge of chances). See generally
infra text accompanying notes 285-87.
279. See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 236 (7th ed. 1999) (defining ―circumstance‖
as ―[a]n accompanying or accessory fact, event, or condition, such as a piece of
evidence that indicates the probability of an event‖).
280. Hawthorne & Stanley, supra note 278.
281. Id. at 584.
282. Id. at 577-78.
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acting.‖283) According to Hawthorne and Stanley, then,
―[w]hen someone acts on a belief that does not amount to
knowledge, she violates the norm, and hence is subject to
criticism.‖284
In the course of defending this thesis, Hawthorne and
Stanley address a question very like the one that arises in
Mary‘s case, namely, ―[whether] we can rationally act on
partial beliefs,‖ or probability estimates, even though
probability estimates are not usually counted as
knowledge.285 Their answer to this question is, in part, that
nothing is accomplished by permitting actors to invoke
probability estimates as reasons for actions, since actors
already are permitted to invoke the background knowledge
on which these probability estimates are based.286 ―[W]hen
someone appropriately acts on a belief about epistemic
chances,‖ according to Hawthorne and Stanley, ―there are
always [known] propositions that are not about chances
that they could instead appropriately use as reasons for
action.‖287
Roughly the same thing is true in the criminal setting.
That is: in cases where an actor‘s probability estimate
appears, intuitively, to bear on the question whether the
risk posed by her actions is unjustifiable, the probability
estimate always winds up being redundant of the known
circumstances. The reason why is twofold.
First, the cases where the actor‘s probability estimate
appears to bear on the justifiability of her actions are just
those where the actor‘s probability estimate is grounded in
what she knows. In Mary‘s case, for example, we stipulated
283. Id. at 578.
284. Id. at 577.
285. Id. at 581. But see id. at 581 (―One possible maneuver is to appeal to
knowledge of chances.‖).
286. Id. at 584-85.
287. Id. at 585; see also id. at 584 (―Whenever we appropriately act on our
knowledge of the high epistemic chance of the proposition that p, we could
equally appropriately have acted on knowledge of propositions that are not
about chances, namely, those propositions we know that make for a high
epistemic chance of the proposition that p.‖)
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that Mary‘s probability estimate was grounded in, among
other things, her knowledge that three or four cars had
passed by in the preceding five minutes. If, instead, we had
stipulated that Mary‘s probability estimate was groundless
—if Mary had acted on the basis of a probability estimate
that was unconnected to anything in her experience, current
or past—her probability estimate probably would not seem
to matter, at least for purposes of the question of whether
her actions were justified.288 In Hawthorne and Stanley‘s
formulation, this untethered probability estimate is not one
that Mary could ―appropriately use as [a] reason[] for
action.‖289
Second, when the actor‘s probability estimate is
grounded in what she knows, her probability estimate will
contribute nothing to the jury‘s evaluation of the
probabilities, for roughly the same reason that imputed
inferential knowledge contributes nothing to the jury‘s
evaluation of the probabilities.290 The jury already is
responsible for deriving the relevant probabilities from what
the actor knows. So to the degree that the actor‘s own
probability estimate is grounded in what she knows, her
probability estimate will add nothing to the probability
calculation.
D. Luck in What Turns Out to Be True
A fourth potential objection to the known-circumstances
formula is that it assigns too much weight to what turns out
to be true. Imagine, for example, two identically situated
actors, Abby and Becky, each of whom briefly leaves a gun
on the kitchen counter within reach of her children, and
each of whom is convinced, with very good reason, that the
gun is inoperable. Abby is right about the gun‘s
288. Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (―[I]n determining whether the
officer acted reasonably in [making an investigative stop], due weight must be
given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‗hunch,‘ but to the
specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light
of his experience.‖).
289. Hawthorne & Stanley, supra note 278, at 585.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 266-72.
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inoperability. But Becky, despite having the same good
reasons as Abby for believing the gun to be inoperable,
happens to be wrong, and with tragic results. The knowncircumstances formula appears to treat these two actors
very differently. Abby‘s belief in the gun‘s inoperability
proves to be correct, so it qualifies as a circumstance known
to the actor. Becky‘s belief in the gun‘s inoperability, on the
other hand, is wrong, and so it drops out of the factual setup
entirely.
What this example appears to demonstrate, at first
glance anyway, is that the known-circumstance formula
gives too much effect to a particular kind of happenstance—
luck in what turns out to be true. To clarify: it would be
wrong to say that Abby is lucky in what she knows. After
all, as stipulated, she has very good reasons for believing as
she does; moreover, as we will see in a moment,
epistemologists appear to agree among themselves that
knowing something, as opposed to not knowing it, is never a
matter of luck.291 On the other hand, it would be accurate to
say that Becky‘s failure to know is unlucky. Despite having
the exact same very good reasons for her belief as Abby,
Becky winds up being wrong. Our intuitions tell us that
epistemic misfortune like Becky‘s ought not to have a
dramatic effect on the actor‘s exposure to criminal
liability.292
291. Linda Zagzebski, The Inescapability of Gettier Problems, 44 PHIL. Q. 65,
66 (1994) (assuming that a true belief acquired ―by an accident of good luck‖
does not count as knowledge); Matthias Steup, The Analysis of Knowledge,
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 3 (Fall 2008), http://plato.stanford.edu
/archives/fall2008/entries/knowledge-analysis (―What turns a true belief into
knowledge? An uncontroversial answer to this question would be: the sort of
thing that effectively prevents a belief from being true as a result of epistemic
luck.‖)
292. The basic intuition is nicely articulated by Douglas Husak and Craig
Callender, albeit in a different setting:
[I]t is clear that one is to some extent lucky to be knowledgeable. Yet it
is perverse to fault someone for being unlucky. Criminal culpability
cannot be thought to be in part a function of whether an agent is
epistemically fortunate or not. What matters for culpability is how a
defendant performs with respect to factors accessible to him; whether
his cognizing has been responsible is important, for irresponsible
cognizing may well count as culpable behavior.
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The answer to this objection lies in the meaning of the
critical phrase ―known circumstance.‖ What is known must
be true, of course.293 And at least where propositional
knowledge is concerned, what is known must be believed.294
But knowledge requires more than true belief.295 Exactly
what it requires, in addition to true belief, is a subject of
disagreement among philosophers.296 The traditional answer
was justification.297 But this ―justified true belief‖ definition
of knowledge was famously thrown in doubt in 1963, when
Edmund Gettier presented two examples of justified true
beliefs that, as everyone agreed, didn‘t qualify as
knowledge.298 Despite the controversy stirred up by Gettier,
though, it is possible even now to say something
uncontroversial about the critical third condition of
knowledge. Namely, whatever else this third condition is, it
must be (in the words of philosopher Matthias Steup) ―the
sort of thing that effectively prevents a belief from being
true as a result of epistemic luck.‖299

Douglas N. Husak & Craig A. Callender, Wilful Ignorance, Knowledge, and the
‘Equal Culpability’ Thesis: A Study of the Deeper Significance of the Principle of
Legality, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 29, 49 (emphasis omitted).
293. AYER, supra note 28, at 31 (defining knowledge to include, among others,
a requirement that ―what is known should be true‖).
294. See Michael S. Pardo, Testimony, 82 TUL. L. REV. 119, 125 (2007)
(―Propositional knowledge is generally taken to have three constituents:
justified, true, and belief.‖).
295. See AYER, supra note 28, at 31 (―[I]t is possible to be completely sure of
something which is in fact true, but yet not to know it.‖); see also Anthony
Quinton, Knowledge and Belief, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 345, 346
(Paul Edwards ed., 1967) (―It is generally accepted that lucky guesses should not
count as knowledge.‖).
296. Steup, supra note 291, § 1.2
297. See, e.g., Quinton, supra note 295, at 345 (―According to the most widely
accepted definition, knowledge is justified true belief.‖).
298. Gettier, supra note 26, at 122-23; see also BONJOUR, supra note 27, at 5
(observing that the Gettier problem ―has usually been taken to show either that
the three standard conditions for knowledge require supplementation by a
fourth or else, more radically, that the standard conception is irremediably
defective‖).
299. Steup, supra note 291, § 3.
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As it turns out, even this very broad rendering of the
third condition is enough for our purposes. From the fact
that knowledge cannot be a product of luck, it appears to
follow that a person whose belief is a candidate for
knowledge—that is, a person whose belief would count as
knowledge if it turned out to be true—will know other facts
that bear a justificatory relationship to the candidate
belief.300 This is one of the lessons of the Gettier examples
(though not the only one301). In their classic form, the
Gettier examples had two basic features: first, one of the
beliefs that provided justification for the candidate belief
turned out to be false; second, the candidate belief itself
nevertheless turned out to be true.302 The reason why the
Gettier examples didn‘t count as knowledge was that a
person who is right about her conclusion but wrong about
300. See D. M. Armstrong, BELIEF, TRUTH AND KNOWLEDGE 153 (1973) (arguing
that the answer to the Gettier problem lies in requiring, as a condition of
knowledge, ―that the justifying beliefs are known to be true‖). Critics of
Armstrong‘s theory argue that this requirement is not sufficient, by itself, to
solve the Gettier problem; it is possible, they say, to create variations on the
Gettier cases in which justifying beliefs are known to be true and yet the
candidate belief still does not count as knowledge. Steup, supra note 291. These
variations do not, however, cast any doubt on the proposition that the truth of
one‘s justifying beliefs is a necessary condition of knowledge.
301. See Steup, supra note 291, § 2 (showing that it is possible to construct
variations on the Gettier cases in which the justifying beliefs are true).
302. Gettier, supra note 26, at 122-23. Here is a somewhat simplified version
of one of Gettier‘s original examples: Suppose you are justified in believing that
your friend Jones owns a Ford. Perhaps Jones has offered you a ride while
driving a Ford, has bragged about owning a Ford, and even has shown you what
appears to be the title to a Ford. On the basis of this evidence, you justifiably
infer first that ―Jones owns a Ford.‖ In addition, though, you infer the truth of
the disjunction ―Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona.‖ You are
justified in inferring the truth of this disjunction as a matter of deductive logic,
despite the fact that, as it happens, you have absolutely no reason to believe
that Brown is in Barcelona. Now suppose that you are wrong about Jones—he
really doesn‘t own a Ford. But you happen by the sheerest coincidence to be
right about Brown, who really is in Barcelona. In this case, the ―justified true
belief‖ definition of knowledge is satisfied: (1) you believe the proposition that
―Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona‖; (2) you are justified in
believing this proposition; and (3) this proposition is true. At the same time,
though, nobody would say that you know that this proposition is true. The truth
of your belief is a matter of luck, and a belief that‘s true as a matter of luck can‘t
qualify as knowledge. Id.
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her premises is lucky to be right about her conclusion, and
therefore cannot be said to know it.303 This means, then,
that a person whose belief is a candidate for knowledge
usually will have to be right about her premises.304 She
usually will have to know other things that justify the
candidate belief.
With this background, let us return to Abby and Becky.
What made this example work was the stipulation that
Becky‘s belief in the gun‘s inoperability would have
qualified as knowledge (as her counterpart Abby‘s did) but
for the fact that it happened to be wrong. If this is so,
however—if Becky‘s belief would have qualified as
knowledge but for the fact that it happened to be wrong—
then it follows that Becky must have known other things
that justified her belief in the gun‘s inoperability. She might
have known, say, that the gun was rusty from having been
outside in all weather for several years. And she might have
known that her husband had tried several times to test-fire
the gun without success. If Becky had not known other facts
like these that justified her belief in the gun‘s inoperability,
then her belief wouldn‘t have counted as knowledge
anyway, since her belief, if true, would have been true only
―as a result of epistemic luck.‖305
The last step in this argument probably is obvious. If
Becky knew other things that justified her belief in the
gun‘s inoperability, then these ―circumstances known to
her‖ would make themselves felt in the jury‘s probability
calculation to nearly the same degree as the fact of the gun‘s
inoperability would have. After all, the justificatory
relationship is probabilistic—to say that one fact provides a
303. See Zagzebski, supra note 291, at 66 (assuming that a true belief acquired
―by an accident of good luck‖ does not count as knowledge).
304. I say ―usually‖ because it is possible to imagine a case where the
candidate belief, if true, would qualify as knowledge, but where the belief is not
linked to any other belief, true or false. Suppose, for example, that a police
officer is convinced that she smells marijuana. If she proves to be right, she
might be credited with knowledge. See State v. Owensby, No. 36542-1-II, 2008
WL 4147798, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2008). If she proves to be wrong,
however, she would have nothing to fall back on, at least by way of propositional
knowledge.
305. Steup, supra note 291, § 3.
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basis for inferring another is really to say, as the evidence
rules do, that it makes the second fact ―more probable.‖306
And so to say that Becky knew other things that justified
her belief in the gun‘s inoperability is to say, in effect, that
the known circumstances made the gun‘s inoperability
highly probable. The jury‘s calculation of the outcome
probabilities will reflect this. So the fact that Becky‘s belief
in the gun‘s inoperability does not count as knowledge will
have at most a slight effect on the probability calculation.
(I‘ll explain at the beginning of the next Section what I
mean by ―slight.‖)
This point—that an actor‘s epistemic misfortune will
have little effect on the probability calculation under the
known-circumstances formula—is borne out by the courts‘
experience in the search and seizure cases. Consider, for
example, Hill v. California.307 The police officers in Hill,
after putting together enough evidence to justify Hill‘s
arrest for a recent armed robbery, went to Hill‘s apartment
to arrest him.308 When the door to Hill‘s apartment was
answered by a man who fit Hill‘s description, the officers
immediately arrested him. The man insisted that his name
was Miller, and he produced identification indicating
(accurately, as it turned out) that he was Miller.309 The
police officers ―were unimpressed,‖ however, and they
proceeded to conduct a search of the apartment incident to
arrest, during which they found evidence that implicated
Hill in the robbery.310
The case eventually wound up before the Supreme
Court, where among the questions on review was the
question whether the arrest was supported by probable
cause. In resolving this question, the Supreme Court
refused to assign any weight to the officers‘ seemingly
justified belief that Miller was Hill.311 What mattered, the
306. FED. R. EVID. 401; see also LEWIS, supra note 147, at 338.
307. 401 U.S. 797 (1971).
308. Id. at 799.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 799-800.
311. Id. at 804.
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Court said, was the ―probability‖ that Miller was Hill,312 not
what the officers believed. In calculating the probability
that Miller was Hill, the Court considered only what the
officers knew when they arrested Miller: namely, how Hill‘s
accomplices in the robbery had described Hill‘s appearance;
the fact that Miller matched this description of Hill; the fact
the apartment where the officers had found Miller belonged
to Hill; and the fact that Miller was alone in the
apartment.313 This was enough, however. Because the
officers‘ mistaken belief—that Miller was Hill—was
grounded in several other known circumstances, the officers‘
epistemic misfortune ultimately had no effect on the Court‘s
resolution of the question whether their actions were
justified.314
E. The Justified-Belief Alternative
A few pages ago I said that the effect of epistemic
misfortune on the calculation of probabilities under the
known-circumstances formula will usually be ―slight.‖ The
reason why epistemic misfortune has even a slight effect on
the probabilities can be illustrated by Abby‘s and Becky‘s
case. Suppose that Abby‘s and Becky‘s identical ―very good
reasons‖ for believing that the gun is inoperable would
themselves generate a 0.9 degree of probability that the gun
is inoperable. If Abby‘s belief winds up being correct, the
inoperability of the gun will become one of the
312. Id. (―[S]ufficient probability . . . is the touchstone of reasonableness under
the Fourth Amendment. . . .‖).
313. Id. at 799, 803-04.
314. Id. Nor does epistemic good luck, as distinguished from epistemic
misfortune, influence the outcomes of search and seizure cases. See, e.g., Florida
v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000) (―That the allegation about the gun turned out
to be correct does not suggest that the officers, prior to the frisks, had a
reasonable basis for suspecting J.L. of engaging in unlawful conduct. . . .‖);
People v. Sparks, 734 N.E.2d 216, 223 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (―Simply because the
information about the drugs turned out to be correct does not mean that it
provided officers, prior to stopping [the] defendants, with a reasonable basis for
suspecting them of unlawful conduct.‖); Tanner v. State, 228 S.W.3d 852, 860
(Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (―If an officer stops an individual based merely on a hunch
that the individual is ‗up to no good,‘ the fact that the hunch turns out to be
correct does not retroactively validate the stop.‖).
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―circumstances known to her‖ and, as a result, this fact will
not be discounted by its 0.9 degree of certainty. In effect,
this fact will be assigned a probability of 1 by the jury when
it calculates the outcome probabilities in Abby‘s case. The
effect of Becky‘s epistemic misfortune, then, is the
difference between 0.9 and 1. Abby will receive a 0.1
windfall just because she happens to be right.
It would be possible, at least in theory, to eliminate this
windfall by requiring the jury to calculate the probabilities
not on the basis of what the actor knows but on the basis of
what the actor justifiably believes.315 Epistemic justification,
unlike knowledge,316 admits of degrees.317 And so it would be
possible for the jury, under this alternative, to assign the
gun‘s inoperability a 0.9 degree of probability in both Abby‘s
case and Becky‘s. Of course, every other known
circumstance, including the known circumstances that
justified Abby‘s and Becky‘s belief in the gun‘s inoperability,
would require the same treatment in its turn, lest the actor
receive a windfall by virtue of having been right about it.
Abby‘s and Becky‘s justified belief that the gun had been
lying outside for several years might be assigned a 0.95
degree of probability, for example. And their justified belief
that their husbands had tried unsuccessfully to fire the gun
on several occasions might be assigned a 0.8 degree of
probability.
This kind of exactitude, though, has more costs than
benefits, at least in the context of a criminal trial. The
problem with the justified-belief alternative is not the
complexity of the jury‘s task as I have described it. After all,
315. See Clayton Littlejohn, On Treating Something as a Reason for Action, 4
J. ETHICS & SOC. PHIL. 1, 1 (2009) (―In the wake of Hawthorne and Stanley‘s
article, epistemologists are lining up to argue that we ought to replace a
knowledge-based account with some sort of justification-based account.‖).
316. See Fred Dretske, The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge, 40 PHIL. STUD.
363, 363 (1981) (―Knowing that something is so, unlike being wealthy or
reasonable, is not a matter of degree . . . . [F]actual knowledge, the knowledge
that something is so, does not admit of [degrees].‖)
317. See John L. Pollock, Defeasible Reasoning with Variable Degrees of
Justification, 133 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 233, 243 (2001) (emphasizing the
importance of accounting for degrees of justification in a defeasible reasoning
system).
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no one can suppose that jurors actually would assign
probabilities to the actor‘s every belief; the best we could
hope for from the jury would be some rough, intuitive
approximation of this process. The real problem is the
difficulty of constructing or conceptualizing for jurors this
rough, intuitive approximation. It plainly would not be
enough to instruct the jury to measure the probability of
harm on the basis of what the actor justifiably believed. For
one thing, the idea of epistemic justification is likely to be
unfamiliar to many jurors. As Hawthorne and Stanley have
said, ―‗justified belief‘ is a phrase from philosophy
classrooms.‖318 ―[I]t is considerably more natural to appraise
behavior with the verb ‗know‘ than with the phrase ‗justified
belief,‘ or even ‗reasonable belief.‘‖319
Worse, telling the jury to measure the probability of
harm on the basis of what the actor justifiably or reasonably
believed would be affirmatively misleading. What makes
the justified-belief alternative appealing is the possibility of
taking into account degrees of justification. In Abby‘s and
Becky‘s case, for example, this alternative theoretically
would permit the jury to distinguish a belief in the gun‘s
inoperability that carries, say, a 0.9 degree of justification
from a belief in the gun‘s inoperability that carries only a
0.6 degree of justification. But telling the jury simply to
measure the probability of harm on the basis of what the
actor justifiably or reasonably believed would obscure this
very distinction. As I have argued elsewhere of the phrase
―reasonable belief,‖ the phrase ―justified belief‖ doesn‘t, by
itself, carry any information about the belief‘s degree of
certainty, or about the belief‘s degree of justification.320 A
belief of 0.6 degree of justification is as much a ―justified
belief‖ as a belief of 0.99 degree of justification. Thus, unless
the jury was instructed specifically to take degrees of
justification into account—and it could not realistically be
318. Hawthorne & Stanley, supra note 278, at 573.
319. Id.
320. See Eric A. Johnson, supra note 275, at 519-21 (arguing that the
reasonableness of a belief does not tell us whether the belief was sufficiently
certain to justify action under the circumstances in which the actor found
herself).
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so instructed—the jury likely would assign a probability
value of 1 to every belief that was justified at all.
CONCLUSION
Everything that seems, intuitively, to bear on the
justifiability and lawfulness of an actor‘s conduct is either
included in or implied by the circumstances known to the
actor. What the known-circumstances formula leaves out—
what are neither included in nor implied by the known
circumstances—are just those of the actor‘s beliefs and
thoughts that are untethered to anything in the actor‘s
experience of the world. But this is as it should be. No one
would say, in a search and seizure case, that the
justifiability of a police officer‘s actions depended in part on
her ―baseless‖ or ―groundless‖ suspicions or beliefs.321 This
ought to tell us that in the criminal law the actor‘s
untethered beliefs bear only on the question that
distinguishes criminal law from search and seizure, namely,
the question of culpability. Holmes and Wechsler were
right: where the question of justifiability is concerned, what
matters, finally, is not the contents of the actor‘s mental
field but the actor‘s relationship to the world. Of this
relationship, the circumstances known to the actor are ―the
whole picture.‖322 The probabilities that bear on the
justifiability of an actor‘s conduct are the probabilities that
inhere in what she knows.
321. See, e.g., Shipman v. State, 282 So. 2d 700 (Ala. 1973) (explaining that
the probable cause requirement prevents police from ―acting on mere groundless
suspicion‖); Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 832 A.2d 1123, 1128 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2003) (―This Court has repeatedly held that reasonable suspicion is not satisfied
by an officer‘s hunch or baseless suspicion.‖).
322. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) (―[T]he essence of all
that has been written [about the reasonable suspicion standard] is that the
totality of the circumstances—the whole picture—must be taken into account.‖);
see also, e.g., People v. Avant, 771 N.E.2d 420, 428 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001)
(mentioning that reasonable suspicion is judged on the basis of the facts known
to the officer and that reasonable suspicion is judged on the basis of the ―whole
picture‖); Bentley v. State, 846 N.E.2d 300, 307 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (remarking
both that reasonable suspicion is judged on the basis of the facts the officer
knows at the time of the stop and that reasonable suspicion is judged on the
basis of ―the whole picture‖).
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This point has far-reaching implications for the criminal
law. Most importantly, it means that the criminal law can
satisfy both of the two widely shared intuitions that lay
behind Holmes‘s development of the known-circumstances
test. It can satisfy, first, the intuition that the criminal law
has an objective or ―external‖ component, whose rules of
conduct are ―independent of the degree of evil in the
particular person‘s motives or intentions.‖323 And it can
satisfy, at the same time, the intuition that the
wrongfulness of an actor‘s conduct depends mostly on
probabilities—on
the
act‘s
tendency
under
the
circumstances.324 Put somewhat differently, the availability
of a workable conception of objective probability means,
happily, that the criminal law need not resort to purely
subjective probabilities—to the actor‘s own elusive ―beliefs
about the probabilities of outcomes‖325—as a basis for
defining and grading risk-based offenses.
In Marjorie Knoller‘s case, then, the law can satisfy,
first, our intuition that what distinguishes Knoller from a
responsible pet-owner—what makes her conduct wrong—is
―[t]he degree of probability of the consequence.‖326 At the
same time, the law can satisfy our intuition that the
wrongfulness of Knoller‘s conduct does not depend on the
probabilities assigned by Knoller herself to the outcome. It
does not depend on whether, as Knoller claimed at trial, she
―‗had no idea that [Bane, one of the two dogs,] would ever do
anything like that to anybody.‘‖327 The wrongfulness of her
conduct can be made to depend on what she knew: on the
letter from the dog‘s veterinarian warning Knoller of the
danger posed by the dogs; on the thirty or so prior ―incidents
of the two dogs being out of control or threatening humans
and other dogs‖ while in the care of Knoller or her husband;
323. HOLMES, supra note 39, at 50.
324. Id. at 75.
325. ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 11, at 63 (arguing that the actor‘s criminal
liability depends exclusively on the actor‘s subjective beliefs about probability);
see also WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 62 (―[T]he extent of probability of the damage
is a subjective question, dependant on the foresight of the accused. . . .‖).
326. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, § 21, at 58.
327. People v. Knoller, 158 P.3d 731, 736 (Cal. 2007).
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on the size of the two dogs; on what Knoller had been told
by the dogs‘ previous owners; on the document found in
Knoller‘s apartment, describing the Presa Canario breed as
―a gripping dog . . . always used and bred for combat and
guard . . . [and] used extensively for fighting. . . .‖328
No less important are the implications of the knowncircumstances formula for cases like Sharan Ann
Williams‘s.329 Williams, recall, was prosecuted for reckless
injury to a child after her two children died in a house fire
while her boyfriend was babysitting them.330 Unlike Knoller,
Williams apparently thought she had done something
wrong: she lied to her husband about the children‘s
whereabouts,331 then admitted to the police that ―she should
have brought [her children] home‖ instead of leaving them
at the boyfriend‘s house.332 Our intuition, though, is that
Williams‘s liability ought to depend not (or not only) on
whether she thought she had created an unjustifiable risk,
but on whether she really had. The known-circumstance
test satisfies this intuition. It permits us to conclude, as the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals did, that—no matter ―the
degree of evil in [Williams‘s] motives or intentions,‖333 no
matter that Williams was a prostitute334 and ―a ‗bad‘ mother,
unworthy of her mother, her children, and her
boyfriend‖335—Williams‘s acts ―are simply not acts that,
viewed objectively under these particular circumstances,
involved ‗an extreme degree of risk, considering the

328. See id. at 733-35.
329. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
330. Id. at 746, 749.
331. Id. at 771 (Keller, P.J., dissenting) (―[Williams] was aware of the risk of
fire and, because of this awareness, thought she needed to hide the truth about
where the girls were from their father.‖).
332. Id.
333. HOLMES, supra note 39, at 50.
334. Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 770 n.4 (Keller, P.J., dissenting).
335. Id. at 769 (majority opinion).
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probability and magnitude of the potential harm to
others‘.‖336

336. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10,
23 (Tex. 1994)).

